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INTRODUCTION
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA" or "the Act")'
stands as one of the cornerstones of federal labor legislation,
establishing for a broad range of workers federally mandated
minimum wage and premium wage rates for overtime work.2  The
Act, however, exempts from its coverage all employees who work in
a "bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity."3
This Article argues that the FLSA exemption for managerial and
professional employees has no legitimate rationale, and that Congress
should amend the FLSA so that it reaches such employees. Specifical-
ly, this Article proposes that the FLSA be amended to require
employers to provide their managerial and professional employees
with compensatory time off from work ("comp time") for hours
worked beyond a standard workweek.4
Limiting the excessive hours now worked by most managerial and
professional employees would produce tangible benefits by: (1)
reducing the growing problem of white-collar unemployment by
requiring employers to increase hiring, (2) increasing productivity by
reducing the strain of overwork, and (3) enriching the lives of the
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
2. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
4. Legal literature on the FLSA is sparse, but interest in work hours appears to be growing
among economists, historians, and other commentators who write about the workplace. See, e.g.,
BENJAMIN K. HuNNictrr, WORK WrrHOtT END: ABANDONING SHORTER HOURS FOR THE RIGHT
TO WORK 240-49 (1988) [hereinafter HUNNIctT, WORK WITHOUT END] (discussing historical
and political background to passage of FLSA); ROSABETH M. KANTER, WHEN GIANTS LEARN TO
DANCE: MASTERING THE CHANGES OF STRATEGY, MANAGEMENT AND CAREERS IN THE 1990S 267-80
(1989) (examining causes for recent increase in white-collar workers' hours); DAVID R. ROEDIGER
& PHILIP S. FONER, OUR OwN TIME: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR AND THE WORKING DAY 243-
77 (1989) (discussing history of labor's efforts for shorter work hours);JULIET B. SCHOR, THE
OVERWORKED AMERICAN 66-67 (1991) (discussing increase in hours worked bynAmericans);John
L. Zalusky, The United States-The Sweatshop Economy. The Case for Fewer Hours of Work
and More Leisure Time 5 (Jan. 6, 1993) (unpublished manuscript presented to meeting of
Industrial Relations Research Association, on file with The American University Law Review)
(arguing for shorter working hours and more leisure time).
This Article draws on the insights contained in these works. In particular, the reform
proposed here builds on the work of Schor and Kanter. See infra text accompanying notes 314-
16. Unlike those works, however, this Article attempts to provide an analysis not only of relevant
social and economic conditions, but of the legal landscape as well.
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affected employees by providing them with meaningful amounts of
time away from the job to devote to family or other pursuits.
Congress never made explicit its reasons for exempting managerial
and professional employees when it enacted the FLSA in 1938. The
Act's framers may have felt that the privileged position of managers
and professionals in the workforce, along with the bargaining power
such employees supposedly enjoyed,5 made government regulation
of their work hours unnecessary. The Act's framers may even have
feared that the courts would deem such government regulation
unconstitutional.6
Today, managerial and professional employees still constitute a
privileged stratum of the workforce, generally enjoying wages and
benefits superior to those of the rank and file.' Over the last fifty
years, however, legal, social, and economic developments have greatly
strengthened the case for regulating their work hours. As the U.S.
economy has grown more competitive, American employers have
responded by laying off workers while demanding more effort from
those they continue to employ. In this move to create leaner, more
cost-effective operations, employers have not spared their managerial
and professional employees.8 As a result, significant numbers of
managers and professionals go jobless while those with jobs strain
under employer demands for excessive hours.' These twin problems
of unemployment and overwork for the managerial-professional class
cannot be easily overlooked; while managerial and professional
employees constituted a slim portion of the labor force when
Congress enacted the FLSA, the last fifty years have seen their ranks
swell to the point where they now constitute over one-quarter of the
entire paid workforce.1"
At the time Congress passed the FLSA, managerial and professional
employees who lacked sufficient bargaining power to resist long hours
of work at least had the option of organizing collectively under the
5. See infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
6. See infra text accompanying note 171.
7. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Companies Need Guidance on Downsizing, 138 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 481 (Dec. 16,
1991) (discussing companies' downsizing and increased workload for remaining white-collar
employees); Gail Bronson & Robert S. Morse, What Executives Are Getting Paid These Days, U.S.
NEWS & WoRLD REP., Oct. 17, 1983, at 72 (discussing white-collar cutbacks as companies more
carefully scrutinize needs); Louis Uchitelle, Strong Companies Are Joining Trend to Eliminate Jobs,
N.Y. TIMES,July 26, 1993, at Al, Al (discussing current trends in corporate America's downsizing
of management-level workforce and its impact on remaining workers); see also infra notes 134-38
and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 117-33 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 8386 and accompanying text.
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protection of federal labor law." Indeed, many managers and
professionals exercised that option. 2 Since passage of the Act,
however, labor law protection for such organizing efforts has been
substantially scaled back. Within a decade after the enactment of the
FLSA, Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)' 3 to eliminate labor law protection for supervisory employ-
ees in the private sector. 4 The U.S. Supreme Court later eliminated
such protection for all private sector managerial employees, including
those with no supervisory functions. 5 At the same time, in the
public sector, the number ofjurisdictions allowing collective bargain-
ing by supervisors has dwindled. 6 Although professionals still enjoy
nominal labor law protection for their organizing efforts, the
managerial exception to the NLRA has placed such protection in
doubt for all but those with the lowest level jobs. 7
Another major development supporting the amendment proposed
here has been the entry of substantial numbers of women into the
managerial and professional workforce.' At the time of the FLSA's
enactment, nearly three-quarters of managers and professionals in the
workforce were male.'9 Almost all of the wives of these employees
stayed home and took care of domestic responsibilities such as raising
children, thus making it possible for their husbands to spend long
hours at the office when necessary
2 0
Today, by contrast, women constitute nearly one-half of all
managerial and professional employees.2 1 These female managers
and professionals, unlike their male predecessors, typically do not
have a spouse staying home to provide childcare and other domestic
labor.22 Indeed, the reality is that female managers and profession-
als bear nearly the entire burden of their families' childcare duties.
23
Employer demands for excessive work hours threaten to drive away
11. See infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 191-93, 201-04 and accompanying text.
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
14. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 215-24 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing changes in gender roles since
1940).
22. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (discussing domestic burdens on female
managers and professionals).
23. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (describing "double load" of workplace
and home responsibilities on working women).
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those female managers and professionals who now struggle to balance
workplace and family responsibilities.24 By making jobs more
manageable, a statutory limit on excessive work hours would help
women keep their jobs. Such a limit would not only help maintain
the sexual integration of the managerial and professional workforce,
but would even help women earn promotions to upper management,
where they are now significantly underrepresented.'
Amending the FLSA to mandate comp time for managers and
professionals would undoubtedly add to the labor costs borne by
employers. Such an amendment would in effect set a ceiling on the
total hours employers could work their managerial and professional
employees. Employers seeking additional work could no longer just
demand more hours from their current employees; they would have
to hire more workers.26 Unscrupulous managers and professionals
might further increase these costs by deliberately slowing their work
speed, or even lying about the number of hours worked, in order to
generate unearned comp time. 7 Despite these costs and potential
abuses, however, the social benefits to be gained, as is discussed in
greater detail below, clearly justify regulating the hours of managerial
and professional employees. 8
Part I of this Article discusses the history of hours regulation
leading up to the enactment of the FLSA in 1938, and the develop-
ment of the Act's managerial-professional exemption since then. Part
II discusses the past and present state of the managerial-professional
workforce, including the size and composition of the workforce, the
hours worked by managerial and professional employees, and the
prevalence of unemployment among them. Part III explores why
Congress may have written the managerial-professional exemption
into the Act in 1938, and whether any legitimate reasons justify the
exemption today. Finally, Part IV recommends that Congress amend
the FLSA to require employers to provide managerial and professional
employees with comp time for hours worked beyond a statutorily
determined standard workweek.
24. See infra notes 247-53 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (discussing glass ceiling phenomenon).
26. See infra note 257 and accompanying text (anticipating negative reaction of employers
to prospect of hiring more workers rather than demanding more hours from current employees,
but noting that this employer opposition would not justify congressional inaction).
27. See infra notes 290-91 and accompanying text (discussing potential "theft" of overtime
compensation and difficulty of monitoring work of managers and professionals).
28. See infra notes 260-84 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Hours Regulation Prior to 1938
The idea of mandating time off from work for a period of rest dates
back to at least the advent of the ancient Hebrew Sabbath.' In the
United States, efforts to reduce the length of the workday can be
traced at least back to 1791, when carpenters in Philadelphia struck
for a ten-hour day."0 As the nation industrialized, unions continued
to struggle for shorter hours."' Indeed, some of the most significant
events in American labor history, such as the Haymarket riot and the
great steel strike of 1919, arose out of workers' efforts to limit the
workday.8 2 Unionists were not the only advocates for a shorter
workday; reform politicians, social critics, and intellectuals also
endorsed a cap on work hours."8 Indeed, from the beginning of the
nineteenth century until the end of the 1930s, the reduction of
worktime remained one of the nation's most pressing social issues.'
Advocates of the limited workday, both inside and outside the labor
movement, claimed.that restricting work hours would have a number
of benefits, including: (1) constricting the supply of labor and
thereby raising wages; (2) spreading work among more individuals,
thereby reducing unemployment; (3) reducing job fatigue, thereby
making workers more productive and less prone to dangerous
accidents; and, most important to many, (4) increasing the amount
of time workers have to devote to activities outside of work, such as
29. See Exodus 20:9-10 ("Six days you shall labor and do all your work, but the seventh day
... you shall not do any work."); see also THE TORAH: A MODERN COMMENTARY 548 (W. Gunther
Plaut ed., 1981) (describing Sabbath commandment as Israel's "most original contribution to
world law").
30. See SCHOR, supra note 4, at 3.
31. See MARION C. CAHILL, SHORTER HOURS: A STUDY OF THE MOVEMENT SINCE THE CIVIL
WAR 31-58 (1932) (discussing labor agitation for shorter hours in period following Civil War
through 1931); WLLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 37 (1991) (noting that in late nineteenth century, labor movement's "central goal
was to legislate a shorter day"); Richard L. Rowan, The Influence of Collective Bargaining on Hours,
in HOURS OF WORK 18-23 (Clyde E. Dankert et al. eds., 1965) (discussing historical agitation for
eight-hour workday by labor movement). See generally ROEDIGER & FONER, supra note 4, at vii-277
(recounting struggle for shorter workweek by American labor movement).
32. See HUNNICUTT, WORK WITHOUT END, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that issue of shorter
work hours became vital to formation of labor movement in period from early nineteenth
century through Great Depression).
33. See HUNNICUTT, WORK WITHOUT END, supra note 4, at 1-2, 15 (explaining that issue of
shorter work hours gained support from politicians, intellectuals, and social critics who believed
that work performance would improve and that workers with more leisure time would be
healthier, more moral, and more civic-minded).
34. See SCHOR, supra note 4, at 3-4 (noting that since 1930s, there has been little attention
to issue from government, academia, or civic organizations).
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raising a family or engaging in educational, religious, political, or
other nonwork activities.3
5
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, numerous
states responded to agitation for shorter hours by passing legislation
limiting the number of hours employers could work their employees
per day.' Such statutes, however, ran contrary to the reigning
constitutional doctrine of freedom of contract, which generally
prohibited governmental intrusion into the employment relation-
ship.37 According to the prevailing view, most workers could bargain
for themselves and therefore did not need statutory protection.38 In
general, prior to the New Deal, the only hours statutes that could
withstand constitutional scrutiny were those that limited the work
hours of women and children, or the hours of men whose jobs
created a hazard to themselves or to the public.3 9
35. See CAHILL, supra note 31, at 37-65 (discussing history of labor movement in nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries); ROEDIGER & FONER, supra note 4, at ix, 196, 244-45 (providing
historical background to movement for shorter work hours and discussing labor's role in
movement); Benjamin K. Hunnicutt, The End Of Shorter Hours, 25 LAB. HIsT. 373, 388 (1984)
(discussing benefits of shorter hours: decreased work, higher wages, expansion of employment,
reduction of unnecessary production and surpluses, and guarantee of minimum living standards
for greater number of people); Ray Marshall, The Influence of Legislation on Hours, in HOURS OF
WORK 50-51 (Clyde E. Dankert et al. eds., 1965) (summarizing arguments espoused by labor for
shorter work day).
36. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3098-3100 (1913) (limiting to eight hours of work per
day all electric light and power plant employees); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 3921-3923 (1908)
(limiting work by mechanics, laborers, and workers on all state public works projects). See
generally HuNNIcuwr, WORK WITHOUT END, supra note 4, at 20-21 (discussing state law limits on
work hours for women, men in hazardous occupations, and railroad workers).
37. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 173 (1908) (asserting that general right
to contract in relation to business is protected by 14th Amendment and that any legislation that
disturbs right of employer and employee to contract "is an arbitrary interference with the liberty
of contract which no government can legallyjustify in a free land"), overruled by Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941), and overruled by Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry.
& S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (striking down
New York statute regulating hours of bakery employees on ground that "[t] he statute necessarily
interferes with the right of contract between the employer and employees"), overruled by Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952). See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 572 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)) (noting
that government restriction of terms of personal employment contract was seen as substantial
impairment of liberty).
38. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57 (implying that bakers are fully capable of asserting their rights
and caring for themselves without protective arm of legislature); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Lochners Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 877 (1987) (recounting that Court in Lochner believed
that "bakers were of full legal capacity" and did not need protection of state).
39. See FORBATH, supra note 31, at 180-81, 190-91 (listing nineteenth and early twentieth
centuryjudicial decisions on statutes regulating work hours); NATIONAL INDUS. CONFERENCE BD.,
LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON HOURS OF WORK IN THE UNrrED STATES: A REFERENCE MANUAL 24-25
(1924) (stating that unless occupation ordinarily performed by men was particularly hazardous,
regulation would not withstand constitutional scrutiny); Laws Limiting Hours of Employment for
Men, as ofJanuary 1, 1938, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 1938, at 462, 462 (noting that most labor
laws regulated employment of women and minors); see also Baltimore & Ohio R.R v. ICC, 221
U.S. 612, 619 (1911) (upholding federal statute regulating hours of railroad employees in light
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Not until the economic crisis of the Great Depression did the
Federal Government attempt to regulate hours for workers generally.
The first attempt came with the passage of the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NRA) ° during President Franklin Roosevelt's first
term. The NRA authorized employers and employees in any trade or
industry to establish codes of fair competition which would fix, inter
alia, maximum hours of work for employees in that trade or indus-
try.41 Codes established under the NRA set legal limits on the
workweek for employees in numerous industries.' However, the
short life of the NRA, and the codes promulgated under it, ended in
1935 when the Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional
on the grounds that Congress had impermissibly regulated intrastate
commerce and had also improperly surrendered its legislative power
to the executive branch.'
B. The Fair Labor Standards Act
The Roosevelt administration's second attempt to win broad hours
regulation came to fruition in 1938 with the passage of the FLSA."
In addition to setting a nationwide minimum wage and prohibiting
"oppressive" child labor, the FLSA required employers to pay
employees covered by the Act a premium overtime wage of not less
than one and one-half times the employee's regular hourly wage for
each hour worked beyond the standard workweek.' The purpose
of "dangers incident to the strain of excessive hours of duty"); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,
423 (1908) (upholding Oregon statute limiting workday for female factory employees).
40. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
41. See id. § 7(a), 48 Stat. at 198-99 (providing that "employers shall comply with the
maximum hours of labor, minimum rules of pay, and other conditions of employment, approved
or prescribed by the President").
42. See id. § 3,48 Stat. at 196-97 (granting to President authority to approve industrial codes
of fair competition upon application by "one or more trade or industrial associations or
groups"); see also HUNNICUT, WORK WrrIoUT END, supra note 4, at 175-88 (commenting on
attempts under NRA to effect codes of fair competition in broad range of industries). The NRA
codes excluded professionals and executives who earned more than a certain amount per week.
See ORME W. PHELPS, THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 26
(1939) (discussing exemptions from maximum hours of labor approved by President, including
'registered pharmacists or other employed professional people" and "executives getting over $35
a week").
43. A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935).
44. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-
219 (1988)). See gnerayJOSEPH P. LASH, DEALERs AND DREAMERS: A NEW LOOK AT THE NEW
DEAL 334-41 (1988) (discussing political and legal maneuvers behind passage of FLSA); WILLIAM
E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKUIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEw DEAL: 1932-1940, at 261-63 (1963)
(discussing conservative opposition to federal wage-and-hour regulation).
45. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, §§ 6, 7, 12, 52 Stat. at 1062-64, 1067
(setting forth minimum wage provision, overtime pay provision, and child labor provision).
Originally set at 44 hours, the standard workweek is now set at 40 hours. § 7(a), 52 Stat. at
1063.
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of the Act's overtime provision, according to subsequent judicial
interpretation, was: (1) to reduce unemployment by encouraging
employers to hire more workers instead of requiring their current
employees to work excessive hours, and (2) to compensate employees
for the burden of working excessive hours.' As economists Ronald
Ehrenberg and Paul Schumann have explained:
[T]he provisions of the act can be rationalized in terms of the
divergence between private and social costs. Even if employers and
their employees in the 1930s were satisfied with long workweeks,
their private calculations ignored the social costs borne by the
unemployed. The time and a half rate for overtime can be thought
of as a tax to make employers bear the full marginal social cost of
their hours decisions; it was meant to reduce the use of overtime
hours.... Furthermore, if employees were not satisfied with long
workweeks during the 1930s but, because of market imperfections,
did not have the freedom to choose employment with employers
who offered shorter workweeks, the direct payment of the tax to
employees who worked long workweeks can be understood as an
attempt to remedy this imperfection. 7
C. The Managerial-Professional Exemption
The FLSA, however, did not apply to all employees.' The
managerial-professional exemption, contained in section 13(a) of the
Act, excluded from coverage "any employee employed in a bona fide
executive, administrative, [or] professional capacity."4 9 This statutory
exemption for managers and professionals has remained unchanged
since 1938, except for a 1966 amendment that broadened the
exemption to include "any employee employed in the capacity of
academic administrative personnel or teacher in elementary or
secondary schools."
50
Shortly before the Act took effect in 1938, the Wage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor51 issued its first regulations
interpreting the exemption. In this first set of regulations, the
46. Walingv.Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419,423-24 (1945); Brennan
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 561 F.2d 477, 482 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978);
Conway v. Takoma Park Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 786, 790 (D. Md. 1987),
dismissed, 838 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1988).
47. RONALD G. EHRENBERG & PAUL L. SCHUMANN, LONGER HOURS OR MORE JOBS? AN
INVESTIGATION OF AMENDING HOURS LEGISLATION TO CREATE EMPLOYMENT 3-4 (1982).
48. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 13, 52 Stat. at 1065-66.
49. § 13(a), 52 Stat. at 1065.
50. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, sec. 214, § 13(a) (1),
80 Stat. 830, 837 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1) (1988)).
51. The Wage and Hour Division itself came into being with the passage of the Act. See 29
U.S.C. § 204(a) (1988).
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Division defined "executive" and "administrative" employees as those
who direct the work of others.' It defined "professional" employees
as those whose work requires "educational training in a specially
organized body of knowledge."'
Two years later, in 1940, the Wage and Hour Division expanded its
definitions of managerial and professional employees after receiving
a barrage of criticism from employers who complained that the
original definitions were too narrow. 4 Unlike the original regula-
tions, the new regulations included a definition for "administrative"
employees separate from that of "executive" employees in order to
exempt from the Act employees, such as assistants to executives, who
exercised discretion on the job and acted as part of management but
did not necessarily direct the work of others.5 The new regulations
also expanded the definition of "professional" employee to include
not only those in learned professions, but those engaged in a field of
"artistic endeavor."56
Since 1940, the Wage and Hour Division's definitions of managerial
and professional employees have remained largely unchanged.
Currently, an employee earning more than $250 per week falls within
the definition of "executive" if the employee's "primary duty consists
52. See 3 Fed. Reg. 2518 (1938) (defining primary duties of executives and administrators
as directing work of other employees and possessing authority to hire and fire); see also Andrews
Defines Exempt Employees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1938, at 1, 4 (reporting on initial regulations under
FLSA).
53. Andrews Defines Exempt Employees, supra note 52, at 1.
54. See, e.g., Who's an Executive?, BUS. WK., Apr. 20, 1940, at 34, 34 (reporting that leaders
of wholesale distributive trades "descended on Washington" to convince Wage and Hour
Administratior to broaden definition of "executive" under FLSA). See generally WAGE & HOUR
Div., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PUB. No. 1412, "ExECUTIVE, ADMINISTATIVE, PROFESSIONAL...
OUTSIDE SALESMAN" REDEFINED, EFFECTIVE OcT. 24,1940, REPORTAND RECOMMENDATION OFTHE
PRESIDING OFFICER AT HEARINGS PRELIMINARY TO REDEFINITION (1940) [hereinafter 1940
REPORT].
55. See 1940 REPORT, supra note 54, at 4, 27 (noting that although terms "executive" and
"administrative" are vague and overlapping, common understanding will not be confused if
"executive" is applied to bosses over persons, and "administrative" to persons who establish or
carry out policy). Compare 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (1943) (defining "executive" as one whose primary
duty consists of management, and who directs work of two or more persons, has hiring and
firing authority, exercises discretionary powers, and spends more than 80% of work time
performing such duties, while receiving salary of more than $55 per week) with 29 C.F.R. § 541.2
(1943) (defining "administrative" employee as one whose primary duty consists of office or non-
manual fieldwork related to management policies, and who exercises discretion and
independentjudgment, assists executives, performs under only general supervision, devotes 80%
of work time to these functions, and receives no less than $75 per week).
56. 29 C.FR. § 541.3 (1943) (defining "professional" as employee who works at job
requiring advanced learning or original and creative capacity in field of recognized artistic
endeavor, consistently exercises discretion and independent judgment, works in field that is
intellectual and varied in character, spends 80% of workday in such activities, and receives not
less than $75 per week).
57. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.119(a) (1992) (retaining basic language of 1940 regulations but
changing base salary qualification to $250 per week).
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of the management of the enterprise in which employed or of a
customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof and
includes the customary and regular direction of the work of two or
more other employees."' An employee earning more than $250 per
week falls under the definition of "administrative employee" if the
employee's "primary duty consists of either the performance of office
or nonmanual work directly related to management policies or
general business operations of the employer or the employer's
customers."59 A "professional" is an employee earning more than
$250 per week "whose primary duty consists of the performance of
work requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or
learning" or "work requiring invention, imagination, or talent in a
recognized field of artistic endeavor."' If an employee earns less
than $250 per week, a more extensive test, known as the "long
test,"61 applies to determine whether she or he is an executive,
administrative, or professional employee.62 An employee who meets
the long test can be deemed an executive or administrative employee
even if paid as little as $155 per week,63 or, in the case of a profes-
sional, as little as $170 per week.'
Under the Wage and Hour Division's definition, the exemption for
executives "extends from the president of a large and complex
corporate structure down to the foreman in charge of a very minor
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 29 C.F.R. § 541.315(a) (1992). Similar regulations exempt from the FLSA managerial
and professional employees of the Federal Government. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 551.204-.206 (1992)
(exempting federal executive, administrative, and professional employees from FLSA). Congress
extended the FLSA to cover federal employees in 1974. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, sec. 6(a) (1), § 3(d), 88 Stat. 55,58 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(e) (2) (A) (1988)). See generally American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Office of Personnel
Management, 821 F.2d 761, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing need for consistent application of
FLSA).
61. See29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1-,3 (1992) (providing detailed analytical checklists for determining
employee's executive, administrative, professional, or outside salesman status). See generally
Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 1220, 1227 n.35 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that "long test," unlike
"Short test," "specifically limit[s] the amount of time an employee may spend on nonexempt
work and still qualify for the exemption").
62. See29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1-.3 (1992) (establishing long tests for executive, administrative, and
professional employees). One criterion under the long test for executives, for example, is that
the employee "has the authority to hire or fire." Id. § 541.1(c).
63. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (f) (1991) (establishing minimum salary for executive employee);
29 C.F.R. § 541.2(e) (1) (1992) (establishing minimum salary for administrative employee).
64. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.3(e) (1991) (establishing minimum salary for professional
employee). One hundred seventy dollars per week, at 40 hours per week, breaks down to $4.25
per hour, the federal minimum wage. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1) (Supp. HI 1991) (establishing
minimum wage at $4.25 per hour as of March 31, 1991). These salary minima are so low that,
as early as 1981, the Wage and Hour Division considered them "seriously outdated." 46 Fed.
Reg. 3016 (1981). A Reagan administration order, which is still in place, has kept these minima
frozen. See46 Fed. Reg. 11,972 (1981) (staying indefinitely effective date of regulation changes).
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department."' Indeed, court decisions have made it clear that front-
line supervisors do not enjoy FLSA coverage.' The exemption for
administrative employees also covers a wide range ofjobs, including
bank teller,6' insurance adjuster,' dispatcher for a tugboat compa-
ny,69  postal inspector,"0  salesperson,' editorial assistant,7  and
investigator in a public defender's office.73  The professional
exemption includes not only employees who practice in what have
traditionally been considered the learned professions, but also game
wardens, 4 airplane pilots,
7' pharmacists,76 physicians' assistants,
77
nurses,78 paralegals, 79 and even student research assistants.'o
65. 1940 REPORT, supra note 54, at 4.
66. See, e.g., Cobb v. Finest Foods, Inc., 755 F.2d 1148, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that
employee who trained new cooks, had no direct supervision, had discretion in setting work
schedule, had salary comparable to other managers, and exercised discretion over hot food
section of kitchen was manager under FLSA managerial exemption); Guthrie v. Lady Jane
Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 1145-47 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying long test to determine that nine
foremen who had responsibility for safety conditions, worked free from supervision, and were
considered management by union, were managers under FLSA exemption even though they did
not exercise great discretion or receive much greater pay than rank and file); Donovan v. Burger
King Corp., 672 F.2d 221, 286-87 (1st Cir. 1982) (upholding determination that under short test,
assistant managers at Burger King making more than $250 per week were managers under
FLSA); Tobin v. Kansas Milling Co., 195 F.2d 282, 286-87 (10th Cir. 1952) (determining under
long test that elevator foreman and miller were executives under FLSA); Juiner v. Macon, 647
F. Supp. 718, 723 (M.D. Ga. 1986) (finding that under long test, transit supervisors who had
discretion over hiring and firing were executives under FLSA); Fight v. Armour & Co., 533 F.
Supp. 998, 1004-05 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (deciding that foreman of shipping and receiving
department was executive under FLSA); Marshall v. Hendersonville Bowling Ctr., Inc., 483 F.
Supp. 510, 516-18 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (holding that employees who supervised pinchasers at
bowling alley were exempt under FLSA), affid, 672 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1981).
67. Wage & Hour Op. Ltr. (Nov. 5, 1943).
68. Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 30,551, at 41,948 (Mar. 14, 1967).
69. See Donovan v. Flowers Marine, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 991, 993-94 (E.D. La. 1982)
(extending administrative exemption to tugboat dispatcher using long test).
70. See Dymond v. United States Postal Serm., 670 F.2d 93, 95-96 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying
short test to include postal inspectors within ambit of administrative exemption of FLSA).
71. See Cote v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 558 F. Supp. 883, 885-87 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(including "detail person" for pharmaceutical company within administrative exemption of
FISA).
72. See Ricci v. El Mundo, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 82, 83-84 (D.P.R. 1949) (including first assistant
to editor-in-chief of newspaper within FLSA administrative exemption).
73. Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 30,952, at 42,474-75.
74. See Martin v. Wyoming, 770 F. Supp. 612, 618 (D. Wyo. 1991) (using long test to place
state game wardens within professional exemption), affd sub nom. Reich v. Wyoming, 993 F.2d
739 (10th Cir. 1993); infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing Martin v. Wyoming).
75. See Paul v. Petroleum Equip. Tools Co., 708 F.2d 168, 173-74 (5th Cir. 1983) (including
airplane pilots within scope of FLSA professional exemption). For a discussion of this case, see
infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
76. Lab. L Rep. (CCH) 3 0,996.47, at 40,569 (Dec. 9, 1965).
77. Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 30,926, at 42,439 (May 10, 1974).
78. Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 30,589, at 41,986-87 (May 25, 1967).
79. See Marianne M. Jennings, The Paraprofessional and the Overtime Exemptions Under the Fair
Labor Standards Act-Do They Apply , 22 LAW OFF. ECON. & MGmT. 315, 315-27 (1981) (discussing
FLSA status of paraprofessionals in law office and concluding that exemptions should cover
these employees so that their field will develop its "full potential").
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II. THE MANAGERIAL-PROFESSIONAL WORKFORCE, PAST AND
PRESENT
A. The Size and Composition of the Managerial-Professional Workforce
When Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938, the managerial-
professional workforce constituted a small portion of the entire wage-
earning population of the United States. In 1940, professional and
technical employees combined amounted to fewer than four million
individuals, or less than 7.5 percent of the workforce." Managerial
employees, at approximately 3.5 million, constituted just over seven
percent of the workforce. 2
Since 1938, the ranks of the managerial-professional workforce have
grown significantly, both in absolute numbers and as a portion of the
workforce. 3  In 1991, the nearly sixteen million professional
employees in the United States constituted approximately fourteen
percent of the workforce, while the approximately fifteen million
managerial employees constituted approximately thirteen percent.
8 4
Together, the two groups now make up well over one-quarter of the
nation's wage earners.85 Indeed, by 1989, the number of managerial,
professional, and technical workers in this country exceeded the
number of blue-collar workers.'
A number of factors have contributed to this growth. First, the
traditional professions have expanded their ranks.87 Institutions that
employ large numbers of professionals, such as hospitals and
80. Wage and Hour Op. Ltr. No. 650 (Sept. 13, 1967); Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 30,800, at
42,192-93 (May 23, 1968).
81. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 140-
45 (1976) (indicating that in 1940, professional and technical employees constituted 7.49% of
total workforce and that professionals alone numbered 3,879,000).
82. See id. at 141 (indicating that 7.2% of wage-earning population, or 3,770,000 persons,
were managerial employees).
83. See HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTuRY 403-09 (1974) (discussing "rapid growth" of managerial-professional
workforce).
84. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1992, at 392
(indicating that 16,058,000 professionals amounted to 13.7% ofworkforce and that 14,954,000
managers amounted to 12.8% of workforce).
85. Id. (indicating that in 1991, number of professionals and managers in U.S. workforce
totaled 31,012,000).
86. See Samuel M. Ehrenhalt, Economic and Demographic Change: The Case of New York City,
116 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 40, 45-46 (Feb. 1993) (indicating that by 1989 United States had 4.5
million more managerial, professional, and technical workers than blue-collar workers).
87. See DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, SALARIED AND PROFESSIONAL
WOMEN: RELEVANT STATISTICS 19 (1988) [hereinafter PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES DEPARTMENT]
(observing that in 1955-56 academic year, 8262 law degrees and 6810 medical degrees were
awarded, compared to 35,844 law degrees and 15,338 medical degrees in 1985-86 academic
year).
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universities, have grown tremendously since World War I."8 In some
cases, technology has created new professions. In 1990, for example,
Congress passed legislation requiring the Secretary of Labor to
promulgate regulations exempting from the FLSA "computer systems
analysts, computer programmers, software engineers, and other
similarly skilled professional workers."89
Moreover, the process of "professionalization" has converted what
were previously considered nonprofessional occupations into what are
today considered professions. Professionalization occurs when
practitioners of a particular occupation establish educational
standards for entry into the field, organize a professional association,
develop a code of ethics, and take other measures to raise the
occupation's stature.' Even at the time the FLSA was enacted,
professionalization was enlarging the ranks of the professions. In its
1940 report on the managerial-professional exemption, the Wage and
Hour Division wrote that "[t]he field of the professions is an
expanding one and twenty years from now professions whose
members will qualify will no doubt be found in occupations not
recognized as professions today."91 As an example, the report cited
accountancy, whose members previously had been trained on the job,
but which, with the advent of the certified public accountant
examination and other measures, had undergone the process of
professionalization.92
A more recent example of professionalization can be seen in Martin
v. Wyoming,"3 a 1991 case holding state park game wardens to be
professionals exempt from the FLSA.94 In reaching its holding, the
Wyoming federal district court noted that before 1965 game wardens
generally lacked college degrees, but that the state had since required
wardens to earn a bachelor's degree in wildlife management, wildlife
biology, or a related field.9" The court also relied on a Wyoming
88. See Marina Angel, Profesionals and Unionization, 66 MINN. L. REV. 383, 385-86 (1982)
(discussing growth of nonprofit institutions and noting that large number of their employees
are professionals and white-collar workers).
89. Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-583, sec. 2, § 13(a) (1), 104 Stat. 2871, 2871
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1) (Supp. II 1990)).
90. See RONALD M. PAVALKO, SOCIOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 34-38 (2d ed.
1988) (discussing process of professionalization).
91. 1940 REPORT, supra note 54, at 35.
92. 1940 REPORT, supra note 54, at 35.
93. 770 F. Supp. 612 (D. Wyo. 1991).
94. Martin v. Wyoming, 770 F. Supp. 612, 618-19 (D. Wyo. 1991) (concluding that state met
its burden of showing that wardens' work was professional in that it required advanced
knowledge in field of science, consistent exercise of discretion and judgment, and salary of at
least $250 per week).
95. Id. at 614.
[Vol. 43:139
1993] FLSA's MANAGERIAL-PROFESSIONAL EXEMPTION
game warden manual, which described "wildlife management" as a
"professional reality," and noted that "[t ] he straight enforcement man
of yesterday has become an old-fashioned fellow in sophisticated
wildlife circles."96
Paul v. Petroleum Equipment Tools Co.,97 which held an airplane pilot
to be an exempt professional under the Act,98 provides another
example of professionalization. As in Martin, the court in Paul
alluded to the occupation's nonprofessional past, but found that
education and training requirements have transformed the occupa-
tion at issue into a bona fide profession. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit wrote, "Whatever the circumstances in the barnstorm-
ing days," pilots now need "extensive, formal and specialized
training."' Similarly, professionalization has also transformed the
status of formerly nonprofessional assistants, such as paralegals and
physicians' assistants."°
Not only have the ranks of the managerial-professional workforce
grown, but they have changed in composition, most notably by an
increase in female members. In 1940, nearly three-quarters of the
nation's managerial and professional employees were male.10'
Moreover, the vast majority of the wives of managers and professionals
stayed home,10 2 providing child care and performing other domestic
chores. Indeed, during the 1930s, public opinion strongly opposed
married women working for wages, especially if their husbands earned
96. Id. at 615. The manual stated:
For many years a Wyoming game warden's role in wildlife management was considered
to be limited to enforcement work. ... When wildlife management became a
professional reality, the assigned activities of the game warden were expanded to
include management work, in addition to enforcement duties. ... The straight
enforcement man of yesterday has become an old-fashioned fellow in sophisticated
wildlife circles.
Id.
97. 708 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1983).
98. Paul v. Petroleum Equip. Tools Co., 708 F.2d 168, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that
pilots of commercial aircraft that require capital outlays of over $1 million have been almost
universally deemed exempt professionals and do not need protection of overtime wage rates).
99. Id. at 173.
100. SeeJennings, supra note 79, at 326-27 (noting that paralegals and medical technologists
must have specialized intellectual instruction in addition to degree); Lab. L. Rep. (CCH)
30,926 (stating that physician assistants are exempt from minimum wage and overtime
requirements if they meet certain criteria).
101. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 81, at 139-40 (providing statistics of major
occupational groups by gender).
102. In 1940, only 13.7% of the wives of professional and semi-professional men worked for
pay as did only 15% of the wives of proprietors, managers, and officials. See Winifred D.
Wandersee, The Economics of Middk-lncome Family Life: Wor*ing Women During the Great Depression,
in DECADES OF DISCONTENT: THE WomEN's MovEMENT 1920-1940, at 45, 54-55 (1987)
(discussing stigma placed on households of most white Americans when wife worked).
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a decent living.'03
Today, women constitute over forty percent of the nation's
managerial employees and over fifty percent of the nation's profes-
sional employees.' °4 Despite the enormous increase in the numbers
of female managers, however, women hold only a tiny fraction of the
top positions in business."0 5 For example, the Department of Labor
recently examined ninety-four large companies and found that women
constituted only 6.6 percent of senior management.' 6
Moreover, unlike their male predecessors, female managers and
professionals generally do not have a spouse at home performing the
domestic chores; by and large, men continue to leave childcare and
other domestic tasks to women. 7 This failure by men to share
equitably in child-rearing has created what has been described as an
"overload" on women who earn a salary and also care for a family.08
103. See ALICE KEssLER-HARms, A WOMAN'S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES 68 (1990) (explaining that efforts to reduce unemployment during Great
Depression included passage of laws that discriminated against married women, as well as public
pressure encouraging employers to fire married women); SUSAN WARE, HOLDING THEIR OWN:
AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE 1930s 27 (1982) (discussing 1936 Gallup poll that showed that 82%
of Americans believed wives should not work if their husbands had jobs).
104. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 84, at 392 (listing percentage of employees by
sex, occupation, race, and Hispanic origin). By the mid-1980s, according to one report, women
made up 94.3% of nurses, 44.9% of accountants and auditors, 27.5% of university and college
teachers, 18% of lawyers, 17.6% of physicians, and 6% of engineers. PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES
DEPARTMENT, supra note 87, at 10. Another report showed that women accounted for 41% of
life scientists, 23% of chemists, 38% of economists, 27% of pharmacists, and 57% of
psychologists. Women and Minorities: TheirProportions Grow in the Professional Workforn; MONTHLY
LAB. REv., Feb. 1985, at 49, 49-50.
105. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 557 (discussing difficulties encountered by women and minorities in
advancing to senior management positions); see also Glass Ceiling Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, § 202(a) (1), 105 Stat. 1081, 1081 (1991) (finding that "despite a dramatically growing
presence in the workplace, women and minorities remain underrepresented in management and
decisionmaking positions in business").
106. See MarshallJ. Breger, The Department of Labor's Glass Ceiling Initiative: A New Approach
to an Old Problem, 43 LAB. LJ. 421, 421-22 (1992) (discussing "glass ceiling" for women and
minorities).
107. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 2(a) (5), 107 Stat. 6, 7
(1993) (stating that "due to the nature of the roles of men and women in our society, the
primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women"); Daisy Quarm, Sxual
Inequality: The High Cost of Leaving Parenting to Women, in WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE: EFFECTS
ON FAMILIES 187, 191 (Kathryn M. Borman et al. eds., 1984) (finding that although working
women do less housework than women with no outside employment, men's contribution to
household chores remains minimal).
108. SeeJeylan T. Mortimer & Glorian Sorensen, Men, Women, Work, and Family, in WOMEN
IN THE WORKPLACE: EFFECTS ON FAMILIES 139, 151 (stating that women face "possible work
overload resulting from their dual responsibilities"); Quartn, supra note 107, at 191 ("The fact
that women have changed their productive roles without men changing their reproductive roles
is placing a great burden on many women.").
Rosabeth Moss Kanter writes:
The new workforce contains an ever higher proportion of women with even greater
education and even greater aspirations, along with a higher proportion of men married
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EconomistJuliet Schor has described the burden on working women
as a "double load" of workplace and home responsibilities, making
"[m]any working mothers live a life of perpetual motion, effectively
holding down two full-time jobs.""°
B. The Nature of Managerial and Professional Work
Evidence suggests that not only has the size and composition of the
managerial-professional workforce changed, but so has the nature of
the work. The late twentieth century has witnessed more and more
professionals working as employees of large bureaucratic institu-
tions,110 positions that allow them less autonomy and that make
them subject to management's efforts to routinize and rationalize
their work.' According to Professor David Rabban, "As organiza-
tions have grown larger and more complex, bureaucrats have imposed
more restrictions on the working conditions of practicing profession-
als. ... Professional work of all kinds has become increasingly
specialized, simplified, and stratified."" 2  As early as 1964, one
commentator, describing the degradation of engineering work, wrote:
[The engineer] often works in a factory-like environment, a large
drafting room, and may be subject to factory-like discipline[;] ...
his discretion is called for much less than he would like; he must
work on a rather limited portion of a total project; and he feels that
he is making very little contribution to knowledge.
3
Front-line supervisory employees too have suffered a deterioration
of their autonomy and authority. Scientific management techniques
to such women. But the very people who are pressing for higher-level positions may
also carry with them heavier outside-of-work demands, particularly centering on family
responsibilities.
KANTER, supra note 4, at 292.
109. ScHOR, supra note 4, at 20.
110. S&e STANLEY ARONOWITz, FALSE PROMISES: THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN WORKING CLASS
CONSCIOUSNESS 306 (1973).
111. See BRAVERMAN, supra note 83, at 211, 408 (discussing "rationalization" process of
breaking down managerial and professional jobs into simple steps); see also ARONOwrrZ, supra
note 110, at 305-06 (discussing limited authority of professionals such as engineers and scien-
tists).
112. David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from Covered Professionals Under the
NLRA, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1775, 1846 n.330 (1989) (explaining that influence of professionals
has significantly eroded, in part because what was once considered professional work is now
being performed by employees with no special training).
113. George Strauss, Prqfessiona orEmplaye-Oriented: Dil mma forEngineeing Unions, 17 INDUS.
& LAB. RFL REV. 519, 523 (1964) (discussing engineers in large corporations who must check
with supervisor before leaving work area and who have coffee breaks closely monitored); see also
Vincent Lombardi &AndrewJ. Grimes, A Primerfora Theoy ofWite-CollarUnionization, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., May 1967, at 46, 47 (stating that task specialization has made work of engineers
"routinized and specialized so that exercise of judgment is reduced to a level at which
substitution can easily be made").
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and centralized administration have eliminated their discretion over
personnel matters, such as hiring and firing, as well as over determin-
ing how work on the shop floor is to be done.11 4  In Donovan v.
Burger King Corp.,1 5 for example, the First Circuit found that a
detailed company operating manual strictly governed the work of
assistant managers at the restaurant chain, providing them with rigid,
step-by-step instructions on matters such as employee training,
inventory, and food production, and "admitting of little or no
variation.""'
Even more notable than this decline in stature is the excessive
number of hours worked by managerial and professional employees,
who, as a group, work more hours than employees in any other
occupational category.17 Since the passage of the FLSA, managers'
and professionals' work hours have increased," 8 especially in recent
years." 9 One 1979 study found that managers frequently put in 60-
to 70-hour work weeks,' and in 1990, the New York Times reported
that managers' average weekly hours had increased sharply from just
a decade earlier.' As Fortune magazine recently noted, "At many
companies the kind of punishing hours once reserved for crises have
become the standard drill. A whole generation of managers have
grown up who never had a 40-hour workweek ...."122 Profession-
114. See Virginia A. Seitz, Lega Legislative, and Managerial Responses to the Organization of
Supervisoy Employees in the 1940's, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 199, 204-05 (1984) (explaining that
although manufacturing supervisors used to have complete control over operations, materials,
and personnel, increasing standardization of operations reduced supervisor's role).
115. 672 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1982).
116. Donovan v. Burger King, 672 F.2d 221, 223 (1st Cir. 1982); see also Russell v. Mini Mart,
Inc., 711 F. Supp. 556, 559 (D. Mont. 1988) (noting that store manager was required to follow
detailed company guidelines);Jane Slaughter, What Women Workers Won in the Reagan-Bush Era:
More Public Support on Issues, Few Actual Gains, LAB. NOTES, Jan. 1993, at 8, 9 (noting bank
managers' loss of status and autonomy).
117. See SCHOR, supra note 4, at 68 (explaining that salaried employees work significantly
longer hours than workers paid on hourly basis, and that half of all salaried workers are
managers and professionals, who tend to work longest hours of all).
118. See Mary T. Coleman &John Pencavel, Changes in Work Hours of Male Employees, 1940-
1988, 46 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 262, 282 (1993) (reporting trend for both sexes toward
increasing work hours for well-educated portion of workforce).
119. See KANTER, supra note 4, at 268 (noting that Americans in "better" jobs are working
longer hours than ever); Nancy D. Holt, Are Longer Hours Here to Stay? Quality Time Losing Out,
A.BA.J., Feb. 1993, at 62, 64 (reporting that American Bar Association study found that number
of lawyers working more than 200 hours per month jumped from 35% in 1984 to 50% in 1990).
120. See DIANE R. MARGOUJS, THE MANAGERS: CORPORATE LaFE IN AMERICA 58 (1979)
(explaining findings based on 81 interviews with managers and spouses who lived in suburban
town and worked for Fortune 100 company).
121. Peter T. Kilborn, The Work Week Grows; Tales from the Digital Treadmill, N.Y. TIMES, June
3, 1990, at El.
122. Brian O'Reilly, Is Your Company Asking Too Much?, FORTUNE, Mar. 12, 1990, at 38, 39
(discussing effects of exhaustion and disillusionment on work ethic among professionals).
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als, too, now put in excessive hours, averaging 52.2 hours per
week. 23  Many routinely work seventy to eighty hours per week.
124
These long hours take a toll on employees personal relationships
and their nonwork interests." Family demands in particular make
many managers and professionals feel that their jobs require too
much of their time.'26 As one commentator has written, "[A]s work
demands threaten to get out of control, life itself threatens to get out
of balance."
127
Ironically, while many managerial and professional employees work
excessive hours, many others have no work at all. Unemployment
among managers and professionals is nothing new. During the Great
123. See KANTER, supra note 4, at 268 (discussing Harris poll findings that those in most
desirable occupations often work longest hours). For figures on the increased workweek of
professionals, see Kilborn, supra note 121, at E3 (providing statistics on percentage ofAmericans
working more than 49 hours per week by job classification and gender).
124. See SCHOR, supra note 4, at 68 (stating that medical residents, corporate attorneys, and
investment bankers are often expected to work 70 to 80 hours per week, and even longer during
hectic periods). Schor writes that:
High-powered people who spend long hours at their jobs are nothing new. Medical
residents, top corporate management, and the self-employed have always had grueling
schedules. But financiers used to keep bankers' hours, and lawyers had a leisured life.
Now bankers work like doctors, and lawyers do the same.
Id. at 18; see also ANNE B. FISHER, WALL STREET WOMEN 166 (1990) (noting that prior to
deregulation of financial industry in 1975, Wall Street had "languid country-club pace," but that
work pace increased thereafter).
This increase in the working hours of managers and professionals constitutes just part of the
increase in hours Americans generally have experienced in the last 25 years. See SCHOR, supra
note 4, at 29 (estimating that in 1987, average employed American worked 163 more hours, or
equivalent of one extra month, than in 1969). This recent increase in working hours is part of
a long-term trend. For a century prior to World War H, the hours of American workers
decreased. However, in the 40 years after the war, this downward trend ceased. SeeJohn D.
Owen, Worktime Reduction in the U.S. and Western Europe, 111 MONTHLY LAB. REv., Dec. 1988, at
41, 42. Now, for the first time since the nineteenth century, working hours are actually
increasing.
125. See KANTER, supra note 4, at 285 ("[Overwork] has important human consequences.
The spillover into personal life threatens relationships that are not easily accommodated to the
demands of the workplace.").
126. See O'Reilly, supra note 122, at 44 (suggesting that companies be flexible with workers'
hours because lack of normal family life is one reason most employees feel that theirjob is too
demanding); see also FISHER, supra note 124, at 168-69 (discussing 1987 survey of Wall Street
financiers who were advanced in their careers, most of whom stated that they would not choose
same career if given opportunity to start over because rewards were not worth such great
personal sacrifices); supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (discussing double burden faced
by many women having full-time careers as well as full responsibility for household chores and
childrearing).
The phenomenon of overworked employees seeking more family time can be seen in studies
from the 1920s of steelworkers after the shift from the 12-hour to the 8-hour day. Historian
Benjamin Hunnicutt writes that "[w]orkers with the 8-hour day naturally turned their attention
to the most basic of social institutions, the family." HuNNICUTr, WORK WITHOUT END, supra
note 4, at 116.
127. KANTER, supra note 4, at 268.
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Depression, job loss ravaged the ranks of the professions.12 8  Some
unemployed professionals obtained jobs with government work
programs, such as the Works Progress Administration." Profession-
al associations, however, generally reacted to the threat of unemploy-
ment by seeking to limit entry into the field rather than by seeking to
increase the number ofjobs.
30
Today, unemployment continues to pose a threat. Though not as
severe as the Great Depression, recent recessions have caused
significant job loss among managers and professionals." Over forty
percent of the jobs lost in the 1991 recession, for example, were
managerial-professional jobs. 2 As the New York Times reported, that
recession "cut a mean swath through the white-collar workforce,"
causing severe unemployment, particularly among young profession-
als.1
33
In addition to economic downturns, structural changes in the
economy have aggravated unemployment for managers and profes-
sionals. During the last decade, many large corporations, faced with
increased international competition and the threat of hostile
takeovers, sharply reduced the ranks of their managerial employees,
128. See HuNNItcrr, WoRK WrrHour END, supra note 4, at 267 (explaining that American
scientists were "particularly hard hit" by unemployment during Depression); Lombardi &
Grimes, supra note 113, at 47 (noting that approximately one-third of engineers experienced
unemployment at least once from 1929 to 1934, while many graduates seeking to enter
engineering field remained unemployed for extensive period during those years); Remedies for
Unemployment AmongProfessional Workers, 33 INT'L LAB. REV. 304, 305 (1936) [hereinafter Remedies
for Unemployment] (stating that "in the majority of countries unemployment is rife among
professional workers").
129. See Remedies for Unemploymen; supra note 128, at 327 (explaining that in United States,
government-sponsored social hygiene program provided employment to 10,000 nurses); White-
Collar Work Under the W.P.A., MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1937, at 1364 (stating that in January
1936, 12% of those employed on W.P.A. rolls were white-collar workers, including physicians,
nurses, teachers, and librarians).
130. SeeJohn A. Garraty, Unemployment During the Great Deprsssion, 17 LAB. HIST. 133, 136-37
(1976). Garraty notes:
In most countries doctors, lawyers, teachers, and other professionals sought to restrict
entry into the universities, to stiffen examinations, to discriminate against women,
especially married women, and to obtain stronger legal protection for professional titles
of all sorts.
Id.
131. SeeJanice Castro, WhereDo They Gofim Here?, TIME, Feb. 11, 1991, at 66, 66 (noting that
since 1982 recession, "[o]rganizations under stress are finding that they must abandon their
traditional sense of loyalty to [middle-management] employees").
132. Kenneth Labich, The New Unemployed, FORTUNE, Mar. 8, 1993, at 40, 46; see also Ivan
Peterson, White Collars and Mortarboards Are No Shield in This Recession, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1992,
at 25 (stating that "recessions that used to spell trouble mostly for factory workers are now also
disrupting the lives of the educated and professional elite").
133. Jane Gross, Graduates March down Aisle intojob Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 9,1992, at Al6
(noting that "only the cream of the crop of young lawyers, bankers, engineers, professors,
journalists and the like are finding the sort ofjobs they expected").
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laying off managers by the thousands."a In total, an estimated 1.5
million middle-managers lost their jobs in the 1980s."-5 Between
1981 and 1986 alone, as American companies tried to reduce layers
of bureaucracy, more than 780,000 supervisors and section chiefs lost
theirjobs, as did many assistant division heads, assistant directors, and
assistant managers." Professionals suffered as well!3  As one
commentator notes, "Massive layoffs and terminations caused by the
recession and the excesses of the eighties have created a phenomenon
that this generation, at least, has not seen before-hard-core, long-
term unemployed professionals."
3 8
While many managers and professionals suffer from long work
hours or unemployment, it is important to note that most receive
relatively high pay compared to the rest of the workforce."l 9 In
1988, the median weekly pay for managerial and professional
employees was $552, while for technical, sales, and administrative
support workers it was $347; for operators, fabricators, and laborers,
$313; and for service workers, $245.1' Moreover, the gap between
managerial-professional pay and the pay of other employees has
increased.' In fact, outrageously high compensation packages for
134. See AMANDA BENNEr, THE DEATH OF THE ORGANIZATION MAN 114 (1990) (discussing
cutbacks in corporations that had never before laid off any employees and explaining that
reductions are caused in part by recessions, company mergers, and changing economies); see also
O'Reilly, supra note 122, at 41 (noting that position of managers changed significantly due to
global competition, rapid innovation, and uncertainty).
135. See KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR: WEALTH AND THE AMERICAN
ELECTORATE IN THE REAGAN AFTERMATH 21 (1990) (noting that CEOs generally prospered in
1980s but that job security was growing concern for those on lower levels).
136. See ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 213-14 (1991) (discussing loss of routine
production jobs for lower and middle management caused in part by shift of such jobs from
advanced to developing nations).
137. See Guy Halverson, Professionals Join Ranks of Nation's Unemployed, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Mar. 29, 1991, atAl, A2 (explaining that structural reorganization in professions such
as finance and banking have resulted in large layoffs); Amy Saltzman et al., Girding for a Pink
Shp, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,Jan. 14, 1991, at 54 (stating that white-collar professionals who
escaped layoffs suffered by manufacturing workers during past recessions are no longer immune,
and that virtually no newjobs would be created in 1991 for professionals in finance, insurance,
and real estate).
138. Patricia C. Slovak, Unemployed Professionals: The New EEO Issues, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW
YORK UNavERSflY 44TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 391, 391 (1991). Increasingly,
professional jobs once held by Americans have moved abroad. SeeG. Pascal Zachary, Like Factory
Workers, Professionals Face Loss ofJobs to Foreigners, WALL ST.J., Mar. 17, 1993, at Al (noting that
"U.S. companies are increasingly hiring highly skilled workers in Asia, the former Soviet bloc and
Europe to perform jobs once reserved for American professionals").
139. See REICH, supra note 136, at 205-06 (finding that in 1987, average male with college
degree earned approximately $50,000 per year, while average male high school graduate earned
approximately $28,000, and average male high school dropout earned approximately $16,000).
140. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 168 (1989).
141. See REICH, supra note 136, at 206 (stating that from 1980 to 1990, wage gap between
average male college graduate and average male high school graduate nearly doubled); Peter
Passell, The Wage Gap: Sins of Omission, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1992, at D2 (noting increasing wage
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top-level executives" have triggered calls for reform.
Not all managerial and professional employees, however, receive
high pay. Managers or professionals in occupations that have recently
undergone professionalization, or those in routine managerial
positions at the bottom of the corporate hierarchy, generally do not
receive high pay compared to the rest of the workforce.' Indeed,
as noted above, Wage and Hour Division regulations allow a worker
to be deemed an executive, administrative, or professional employee
even if she or he earns barely more than the minimum wage.'
45
III. POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE MANAGERIAL-PROFESSIONAL
EXEMPTION
Having examined certain pertinent characteristics of the manageri-
al-professional workforce, this Article now explores why the FLSA
exempts such employees from its coverage. No ready answer exists.
The legislative history of the Act contains no explanation for the
managerial-professional exemption. The Senate and House bills that
were to become the FLSA contained the exemption when they were
introduced,"4 and no debate or discussion of the exemption took
place while the bills were under consideration. 4 7 Since 1938, a few
courts and commentators have offered explanations for the exemp-
gap for both sexes between college and high school graduates).
142. See, e.g., GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF ExCESs 27-28 (1991) (noting that average
American CEO made $2.8 million in 1990, 120 times salary of average factory worker); see also
Louis Uchitelle, No Recession for Executive Pay: Wages at the Top Grew by 8% in 1990, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 1991, at DI (remarking that "[i]n the midst of a recession, with layoffs rising and
corporate profits weak, pay in 1990 for the nation's top executives rose by bigger percentages
than the wages of any other group of salaried American workers").
143. See Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1867, 1869 & n.4 (1992) (exploring possibility that growing public and
institutional investor concern over amount and structure of executive salaries may lead to
tightening restrictions governing such compensation); Bevis Longstreth, CEO Pay: Don't Let the
GovernmentDecide, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1992, at A17 (outlining problems of excessive executive
pay). The Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed revisions to its executive
compensation disclosure rules. See 58 Fed. Reg. 42,882 (1993) (summarizing and explaining
proposed changes to 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.402, 228.402 (1992)).
144. See JOHN W. WIGIrr & EDWARD J. DWYER, THE AMERICAN ALMANAC OF JOBS AND
SALARIES 263, 414, 433, 479 (1990) (finding that in 1989, assistant branch managers at small
banks averaged $17,900 in earnings, executive housekeepers in small hotels averaged $15,301,
starting paralegals averaged $17,200, and registered nurses in Florida state hospitals could earn
as little as $15,330).
145. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
146. SeeS. 2475, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (7) (1937); H.R. 7200, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. §
2 (a) (7) (1937); see alsoJohn S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 464, 483 (1939) (explaining general classes of exemptions in original bill).
147. SeeJoint Hearings Before the Comm. on Education and Labor on S. 2475 and H.P 7200, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1937) [hereinafterJoint Hearings] (failing to discuss exemption for managers
and professionals).
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tion," but such explanations are sparse and necessarily speculative.
This Article examines several reasons why Congress in 1938 may have
exempted managerial and professional employees from the Act's
coverage, and explores whether such possible justifications remain
valid today.
A. FLSA Protection Only for the Most Exploited Workers?
One possible explanation for the managerial-professional exemp-
tion is that the Act was designed to protect only America's most
exploited workers. Because managers and professionals tend to enjoy
superior privileges, pay, and benefits,"' excluding them from
coverage arguably accorded with the Act's overall purpose. Indeed,
several years after enactment of the FLSA, the Supreme Court wrote
that "the prime purpose of the legislation was to aid the unprotected,
unorganized and lowest paid of the nation's working population."
150
Nonetheless, the view that Congress passed the FLSA to protect the
poorest workers ignores certain key facts about the Act. First, as
originally enacted, the FLSA provided no protection for the most
exploited workers in America: agricultural laborers and domestic
workers.'51 Second, the Act covered, and continues to cover, the
most privileged portions of the blue-collar workforce: highly paid
skilled craft workers,5 2 as well as those relatively fortunate blue-
148. See infra notes 177-79 and accompanying text (providing court and commentator
justifications for exempting managers and professionals from FLSA).
149. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
150. Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n.18 (1945) (noting that certain
employees lacked adequate bargaining power with their employers and thus were unable to
secure subsistence wages for themselves).
151. For the Act's exemption of agricultural workers, see Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
ch. 676, § 13(a) (6), 52 Stat. 1060, 1067. The irony of the Act's failure to cover farm workers
did not go unnoticed during congressional debates over the FLSA bill. Representative Fred
Hartley stated, "We are told that this measure will raise the wages and lower the working hours
of the exploited workers of America. If that is the case then why is it that the poorest paid labor
of all, the farm laborer ... has been omitted from this bill?" 83 CONG. REc. 9257 (1938)
(statement of Rep. Hartley).
For the argument that the FLSA's exclusion of agricultural workers constituted racial
discrimination, see Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial
Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REv. 1335, 1371-80 (1987) (arguing that New Deal
legislation, including FLSA, purposely preserved South's plantation system, and therefore
constituted unconstitutional racial discrimination).
Congress extended coverage of the FLSA to agricultural workers in 1966, see Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, secs. 203-204, 302, §§ 13(a) (6), 13(a) (10),
6(a), 80 Stat. 830, 833-36, 838 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 213 (1988)), and to domestic
workers in 1974, see Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, sec. 7, §
2(a), 88 Stat. 55, 62 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 202, 206, 207, 213 (1988)).
152. See 29 C.F.L § 541.119(c) (1992) ("Mechanics, carpenters, linotype operators, or
craftsmen of other kinds are not exempt... no matter how highly paid they might be.") (emphasis
added).
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collar employees who still enjoy union protection.'-" As the Su-
preme Court made clear early on: "[Elmployees are not to be
deprived of the benefits of the Act simply because they are well paid
or because they are represented by strong bargaining agents. "154
Because Congress gave FLSA protection to the relatively privileged
and highly paid elite of the blue-collar workforce, it is not at all self-
evident that exempting the managerial-professional workforce due to
its generally privileged status comports with the Act's purpose.
1 55
B. Constitutionality
The drafters of the FLSA may have exempted managerial and
professional employees because they feared that including them
under the Act's coverage would have been unconstitutional. Those
in the Roosevelt administration who drafted the Act clearly crafted it
to survive constitutional scrutiny, hoping their bill would escape the
fate of the NRA. 156 However, most of the constitutional issues the
FLSA raised, such as Congress' power to regulate intrastate economic
activity, had no bearing on whether the Act covered managerial and
professional employees.
5 7
One constitutional issue, however, did potentially bear on the
managerial-professional exemption: namely, whether the FLSA
violated the constitutional rights of employer and employee to
contract freely for the purchase and sale of labor. As noted above,
courts in the early twentieth century generally had held that statutes
that regulated employees' hours violated the constitutional doctrine
153. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 741 n.18 (1981). As of
1990, only 15% of the private-sector workforce enjoyed union protection. See infra note 283.
154. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161, 167
(1945).
155. This is especially so because, as noted above, many managers and professionals do not
enjoy particularly high pay or status. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text (explaining
that managers in variety of fields earn less than $20,000 per year).
156. See George E. Paulsen, Ghost of the NRA: Drafting National Wage and Hour Legislation in
1937, 67 Soc. Sci. Q. 241, 241 (1986) (discussing debate within Roosevelt administration over
constitutionality of wage-and-hour regulation and over economic and social consequences of
establishing fixed minimum wage and maximum hour standards for all industries). See generally
HuNN cUTr, WoRK WITHouT END, supra note 4, at 242 (discussing talks between President
Roosevelt and union leaders concerning wage-and-hour legislation).
157. For a discussion of these constitutional issues, see Joint Hearings, supra note 147, at 3
(statement of AssistantAttorney General Robert H.Jackson) (outlining differentjudicial theories
of commerce power on which FLSA was based); Robert L. Stem, An Opinion Holding the Act
constitutiona 6 lAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 433,434 (1939) (arguing that FLSA regulations bearing
on intrastate commerce are not unconstitutional because producers with substandard labor
conditions often have advantage over competitors in interstate market); Note, The Fair Labor
StandardsAct of 1938,27 GEo. LJ. 459,468-71 (1939) (concluding that Act's delegation of power
to Wage and Hour Division to administer FLSA is constitutional because mandated wage rotes
will not curtail employment or give advantage to particular groups).
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of freedom to contract, except in limited cases where the affected
employees were women or children, or were men with exceptionally
hazardous jobs. 58  The FLSA, which applied to a broad spectrum
of employees, including adult males with ordinary jobs, extended far
beyond the constitutional constraints set forth in these early cases,
and thereby ran afoul of this traditional jurisprudence.
However, constitutional jurisprudence, particularly concerning the
government's right to regulate the employment relationship, had
changed markedly just prior to the enactment of the FLSA. In West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,'59 a decision issued while the Roosevelt
administration was drafting the FLSA bill,"6 the Supreme Court
significantly broadened the range of permissible employment
regulation by upholding a Washington State minimum wage statute
for women and children 61 simply on the ground that it was "reason-
able in relation to its subject and.., adopted in the interests of the
community." "
In Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation Number 40,163 decided
on the same day as West Coast Hotel, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act,' a federal statute that
protects the right of railroad employees to organize and bargain
collectively.1" The Court in Virginian Railway specifically rejected
the argument that the statute violated an employer's right under the
Fifth Amendment to contract freely, writing that "the Fifth Amend-
ment, like the Fourteenth .... is not a guarantee of untrammeled
freedom of action and of contract. In the exercise of its power to
regulate commerce, Congress can subject both to restraints not shown
to be unreasonable."" The following month, in NLRB v. Jones &
158. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
159. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
160. See Forsythe, supra note 146, at 465.
161. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (stating that Constitution does
not recognize absolute liberty and that state can protect against "evils which menace the health,
safety, morals and welfare of the people"). At issue in West Coast Hotel was whether a
chambermaid could recover the difference between the amount of wages paid to her under her
employment contract and the larger sum required by state minimum wage for women. Id. at
380.
162. Id. at 391; see Sunstein, supra note 38, at 876 (discussing shift in constitutional doctrine
from Lochner to Parish).
163. 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
164. Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577, as amended by Railway Labor Act of
1934, ch. 691, 48 Stat. 1185 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988)).
165. 45 U.S.C. § 152.
166. Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 558 (1937). The Court stated that
the statute's command to negotiate for the settlement of labor disputes, given in the exercise
of commerce power, is not so arbitrary or unreasonable that it infringes on due process. Id. at
559.
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Laughlin Steel Corp.,167 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),' a federal statute
that protects the right of private-sector employees generally to
organize and bargain collectively.69 In Jones & Laughlin, the Court
repeated its position that reasonable government regulation of the
employment relationship did not infringe on the constitutional rights
of either employer or employee.1
70
The permissive reasonableness test articulated in West Coast Hotel
and Virginian Railway, and the approval of a labor statute applying to
adult workers generally in Jones & Laughlin, provided strong constitu-
tional authority for the FLSA.' 71 While these 1937 Supreme Court
decisions may have given proponents of the FLSA some confidence
that Congress could broadly regulate wages and hours, the Act's
proponents nonetheless may have felt that extending coverage to
managerial and professional employees would have gone too far.
Arguably, even a Supreme Court newly converted to the idea of broad
government regulation of the employment relationship may have
questioned the reasonableness of regulating the hours of that elite
stratum of the workforce.
Even in 1938, however, FLSA coverage for managers and profession-
als most likely would have been held constitutional. Indeed, in United
States v. Dary,72 the 1941 Supreme Court decision holding the
FLSA constitutional, the Court rejected a Fifth Amendment challenge
to the Act, and broadly wrote that it was no "longer open to question
that it is within the legislative power to fix maximum hours."
173
Such unqualified language strongly suggests that the Court would
have upheld the Act regardless of which category of employees it cov-
ered.174
Even if constitutional concerns did lead the Act's drafters to add
the managerial-professional exemption, no such constitutional
concerns could justify maintaining the exemption today. The
167. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
168. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)).
169. Id. § 157.
170. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 32-34 (1937).
171. See Joint Hearings, supra note 147, at 5; Stem, supra note 157, at 443; Note, supra note
157, at 476 (arguing that FLSA did not violate due process because power to restrict liberty
interest to protect public welfare extends to contracts between employer and employee).
172. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
173. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125-26 (1941).
174. Those looking for further support for the constitutionality of FLSA coverage for
managers and professionals could have pointed to the fact that, at that time, the NLRA provided
protection for supervisors and for professional employees. See infra notes 200-02 and
accompanying text.
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judiciary now exercises almost no substantive constitutional scrutiny
over Congress' regulation of the economy.75 Accordingly, the
courts would have no grounds to strike down an FLSA provision
regulating the work hours of managers and professionals.
C. Do Managerial and Professional Employees Need Government
Regulation of Their Work Hours?
The most commonly expressed justification for the ELSA's
managerial-professional exemption is simply that managerial and
professional employees do not need the government to regulate their
work hours.17 This notion can be parsed into two separate compo-
nents. First is the idea that managerial and professional employees
do not need government regulation because they have sufficient
bargaining power on their own to withstand demands from their
employers to work excessive hours.177 As one commentator ex-
plained, "Perceiving relatively equal bargaining power between the
two parties, Congress saw no need to invade the right of employer
and manager to fix contracts of employment." 78 The second
component is the idea that excessive hours do not constitute a
problem for managerial and professional employees because they
enjoy certain privileges on the job, along with relatively high levels of
pay and benefits. 79 As explained below, neither of these two
175. See TRiBE, supra note 37, at 582 (noting "virtually complete judicial abdication" of role
in scrutinizing economic regulations).
176. SeeWirtzv. Patelos Door Corp., 280 F. Supp. 212, 216 (E.D.N.C. 1968). The Wrtz court
explained:
[The FLSA] was meant to secure to certain members of the American labor force, who
could not sufficiently protect themselves, relief from substandard wages and excessive
hours. Aimed primarily at protecting the ordinary workingman, the Act included
provisions exempting certain employees from its coverage, among them bona fide
executives, the reason for the executive exemption being that such an employee is not ordinarily
within the group that requires such protective legislation.
Id. (emphasis added).
177. See Harry Rebhuhn, Note, Overtime Compensation Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: The
Status of Managers Performing Strike Duty, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 965, 974 (1982) (stating that reason
for FLSA's managerial exemption is managers' strong economic bargaining power).
The Supreme Court wrote in Brooklyn Savings Bank that Congress enacted the FLSA out of "a
recognition of the fact that due to the unequal bargaining power as between employer and
employee, certain segments of the population required federal compulsory legislation."
Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945). Although the Court did not address
the relative bargaining power of exempt employees, its logic suggests that managerial and
professional employees do not need FLSA protection because they have sufficient bargaining
power.
178. Rebhuhn, supra note 177, at 974.
179. See Marshall v. Western Union Tel. Co., 621 F.2d 1246, 1250-51 (3d Cir. 1980). In
Marshall, the Third Circuit observed:
[G]ranting managerial employees exempt status must have been a recognition that
they are seldom the victims of substandard working conditions and low wages.
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arguments justifies maintaining the managerial-professional exemp-
tion.
1. Do managerial and professional employees have sufficient bargaining
power?
Clearly, employers today demand long hours of their managerial
and professional employees.18 ° Indeed, they have every incentive to
do so. Because managerial and professional employees receive fixed
salaries,"8 ' which do not vary by the hours worked, employers face
no costs, and only stand to gain, by requiring long hours of work.18
In addition to the incentive built into the fixed-salary pay structure,
recent developments in the economy, such as increased international
competition, deregulation, and mergers, have fueled the demand for
long hours. 83  In response to the newly competitive environment,
companies have pruned the ranks of their managerial and profession-
als employees, and have required remaining employees to shoulder
a larger load.8
Congress apparently acted on this basic principle of industrial organization, realizing
that compensation and working conditions of managerial employees normally would
be significantly above those of the hourly wage earner. Therefore, there was no need
for Congress to be concerned about the number of hours worked ....
Id. at 1250; see also 46 Fed. Reg. 3016 (Dep't Labor, Wage & Hour Div. 1981) (stating that
managerial-professional exemption "stemmed from the recognition that such personnel have
special work responsibilities, compensatory privileges and benefits which are superior to those
of other employees"); 1940 REPORT, supra note 54, at 19 ("The term 'executive' implies a certain
prestige, status, and importance. Employees who qualify under the definition are denied the
protection of the act. It must be assumed that they enjoy compensatory privileges."); James A.
Prozzi, Overtime Pay and the Manageial Employee: Still a "Twilight Zone of Uncertainty", 41 LAB. LJ.
178, 179 (1990) (stating that Congress exempted managerial and professional employees
because they do not need overtime pay and have other privileges); May Ease Wage Act on Well-
Paid Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1938, at 40 (quoting administrator of Department of Labor's
Wage and Hour Division as approving exemption for well-paid white-collar employees because
employee in this category "has a certain amount of discretion and. . . does not have to punch
a time clock").
180. SeeKANTER, supra note 4, at 269 (identifying major reason for overwork of managers and
professionals as employers' efforts to consume more and more of their employees' time).
181. See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1988) (providing that employees must receive fixed salary in order
to fall within managerial-professional exemption); see also Martin v. Malcolm Pimie, Inc., 949
F.2d 611, 617 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that employees are not within exception if they are
docked pay for missing fractions of hours); Donovan v. Carls Drug Co., 703 F.2d 650, 652 (2d
Cir. 1983) (holding that pharmacists paid hourly rate do not fall within managerial exemption).
182. See SCHOR, supra note 4, at 68 (noting that for salaried workers, "[e]xtra hours are..
gratis to their employers"); see also KANTER, supra note 4, at 270 (commenting that managerial
and professional employees she studied "were acutely aware that their especially long hours were
not tied to any additional compensation" and that this was "sore point" for them).
183. See BENNETT, supra note 134, at 114-16 (explaining that companies feel long hours are
necessary to keep up with competition and market changes).
184. See BENNET, supra note 134, at 204-09 (describing examples of managers who survived
layoffs only to see their workloads increase significantly); SCHOR, supra note 4, at 70 (stating that
pressure on professionals to work longer hours in recent years "has come largely from
companies, in response to market conditions"); Gross, supra note 133, at A16 (reporting that
166
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It also appears clear that most managers and professionals lack
sufficient bargaining power to resist employer demands for longer
hours. Indeed, the very fact that such employees work excessive
hours1" attests to their lack of bargaining power. 8  The threat
of unemployment makes managers and professionals eager to comply
with, or even exceed, their employers' demands; fearing for theirjobs,
many managers and professionals now work long hours simply to
demonstrate their value to the company.1 87 As Professor Rosabeth
Kanter has explained, recent changes in American businesses have
"multiplied the pressures people feel to prove they are contribut-
ing-to prove that their job 'adds value' in case the company plays
musical chairs with the structure."" In such an environment, an
employer can easily replace any given managerial or professional
employee: according to Juliet Schor, "For every aspiring manager
determined to limit his or her hours, there are usually many more
willing to give the company whatever time it demands."'89 The
simplification of many professional and managerial jobs, and the
corresponding loss of stature suffered by employees holding such
jobs,' can only serve to reduce further the bargaining power of
managers and professionals.
A clear sign that individual managerial and professional employees
lack sufficient bargaining power to limit their work hours can be seen
in the efforts by many such employees over the years to assert their
bargaining power collectively through labor unions. In certain
industries, such as printing, railroads, construction, and maritime,
supervisors belonged to unions as far back as the nineteenth
century.'91 Following the enactment of the NLRA, supervisory
growing number of companies, as they cut back on costly experienced employees, are asking
younger workers to do more for same amount of pay); see also O'Reilly, supra note 122, at 40
(noting that 77% of CEOs polled in 1990 agreed that American corporations would have to
work their managers harder in order to compete internationally).
185. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
186. One could argue, of course, that managers and professionals work long hours due to
their own inclinations. However, the abundant evidence that managerial and professional
employees want more time away from the job, see infra notes 243-54 and accompanying text,
undermines this argument.
187. See Kilborn, supra note 121, at E3 (stating that in 1980s, many companies eliminated
entire layers of middle management and that those employees remaining fear loss of theirjobs).
188. KANrER, supra note 4, at 267.
189. SCHOR, supra note 4, at 71.
190. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
191. SeePhilomena Marquardt, Foreman'sAssociation ofAnerica.: Conditions LeadingtoFormation
of Union, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Feb. 1946, at 241, 241; Seitz, supra note 114, at 211 (noting
existence of supervisory unions as early as 1880s).
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unions sprang up throughout basic industry.192  Professionals in a
number of fields, such as engineers, nurses, scientists, and lawyers,
also began to unionize. 93
One of the reasons managerial and professional employees have
sought to unionize is to set rules regulating their hours. As one of
their central goals, supervisory and professional employee unions
generally seek to regulate the work hours and workloads of the
employees they represent. 94 For example, unionized legal services
lawyers and social workers have negotiated limits to their caseloads,
unionized medical interns have negotiated the maximum number of
nights that they must work each month, unionized teachers have
negotiated class size, and unionized nurses have negotiated limits on
consecutive workdays and numbers of shifts. 195
While unions constitute effective vehicles for increasing employee
bargaining power, too few managerial and professional employees
enjoy union representation to alter the conclusion that, for the most
part, managers and professionals lack sufficient bargaining power to
limit their work hours. In the private sector, only one in ten
professionals bargains collectively,'96 while supervisors and other
managerial employees have no legally protected right to organize.
97
Unions do represent supervisors and professionals in the public
sector, but not all states allow collective bargaining by public-sector
employees, 19s and among those that do, the trend has been toward
192. See Charles T. Joyce, Union Busters and Front-Line Supervisors: Restricting and Regulating
the Use of Supervisoiy Employees by Management Consultants During Union Representation Election
Campaigns, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 453, 469 n.92 (1987) (attributing growth of supervisory unions
to supervisors' desire to protect their independence and authority); Seitz, supra note 114, at 199-
200 (describing advent of managerial unions in mass-production industries).
193. See Sar A. Levitan & Frank Gallo, Collective Bargaining and Private Sector Professionals,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1989, at 24, 24.
194. See ARONOWITZ, supra note 110, at 312 (reporting that, through unions, professionals
"have increasingly concentrated on more pay for fewer hours and smaller workloads");
Frances Bairstow & Leonard Sayles, Bargaining over Wo* Standards by Professional Unions, in
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, COLLECIVE BARGAINING AND PRODUCrIVTY 103,
112 (1975) (noting that reduction of weekly working hours is common negotiating item for
unions representing professional employees).
195. See David M. Rabban, Is Unionization Compatible with Professionalism?, 45 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. Rmv. 97, 103 (1991); see also Bairstow & Sayles, supra note 194, at 110-11 (noting that
research scientists have negotiated education leave and time off for career development);
Strauss, supra note 113, at 523 (noting that engineers' unions negotiate for overtime pay for
their members).
196. See Levitan & Gallo, supra note 193, at 24 (noting that proportion has not changed for
over two decades and is unlikely to change significantly in future).
197. See infra text accompanying notes 200-233 (discussing history of supervisors' loss of right
to organize).
198. SeeJoel M. Douglas, Collective Bargaining and Public Sector Supervisors: A Trend Towards
Exclusion?, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 485, 485 (1987) (observing that 10 states deny public-sector
employees right to bargain collectively).
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denying supervisors the right to organize.'9
a. The loss of the right to organize
In 1938, when Congress enacted the FLSA, one arguably could have
justified the managerial-professional exemption on the ground that
even if managers and professionals lacked sufficient bargaining power
individually to limit their hours, the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) gave them the opportunity to boost their bargaining power
through unionization. At the time, the NLRA covered both profes-
sionals and supervisors.2" In 1936, in its first decision concerning
professionals, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) held that
the NLRA protected a group of engineers, reasoning that "the
engineers have need of organized strength in common with all wage
earners. " "0 The NLRA also provided protection to the organizing
efforts of front-line supervisors. As the Supreme Court wrote in 1946,
"Though the foreman is the faithful representative of the employer
in maintaining a production schedule, his interests properly may be
adverse to that of the employer when it comes to fixing his own
wages, hours, seniority rights or working conditions."
20 2
Under the legal protection of the NLRA, unions representing
supervisors grew rapidly, spurred in part by supervisors' grievances
over excessive work hours and uncompensated overtime work.203 By
1946, the two largest supervisors unions had a combined membership
of over 100,000.24  The next year, however, Congress enacted the
Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA, amendments that, among
other things, removed legal protection for organizing by supervi-
sors.2 5  The Taft-Hartley amendments effectively destroyed private-
199. See generally hi. (documenting trend toward denying supervisors right to bargain
collectively).
200. See Angel, supra note 88, at 416-34.
201. In re Chrysler Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 164, 171 (1936) (noting that nonunion designers,
engineers, and other professional workers were dissatisfied with working conditions and were
in conflict with management).
202. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 489-90 (1947) (holding no basis exists
in NLRA to deny supervisors statute's protection).
203. See Marquardt, supra note 191, at 241 (explaining that in 1941, foremen at Ford Motor
Company complained about six- and seven-day work weeks and increased daily hours); Seitz,
supra note 114, at 207-08 (detailing foremen's reasons for starting labor unions, such as fact that
they received fixed salaries, while rank-and-file employees enjoyed shift premiums and overtime
pay).
204. See Joyce, supra note 192, at 469 n.93 (stating that thousands of supervisors also
belonged to rank-and-file unions).
205. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 2(3),
61 Stat. 136, 137-38 (excluding supervisors from definition of "employee" under NLRA)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988)). For a discussion of the exclusion of
supervisors by the Taft-Hartley amendments, see Angel, supra note 88, at 426.
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sector supervisors unions.2"
Interestingly, the rationale used to justify the FLSA's managerial-
professional exemption-namely, that such employees have sufficient
bargaining power to protect themselves207-- also served as a princi-
pal rationale for removing the legal protection for supervisors'
organizing efforts. 28 By the 1940s, however, front-line supervisors
lacked the power to protect themselves. The advent of scientific
management and centralized administration in large industrial plants
had effectively removed supervisors' discretion and decisionmaking
authority on the shop floor, leaving them with little control over their
working conditions.0 9 In fact, unionization among supervisors
began, in large part, because of this change in their status.1 The
proponents of the Taft-Hartley amendments, however, ignored this
reality.
In 1974, the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,2" ruled
that not only supervisors, but all managerial employees-including
those who perform no supervisory functions-lack the protection of
the NLRA.212 In Bell Aerospace, the Court considered whether the
NLRA protected the organizing efforts of a group of buyers in a
company's purchasing and procurement department.213  After
examining the Taft-Hartley amendments, the Court concluded that
Congress never intended the unionization of employees "who
formulate and effectuate management policies, yet have no superviso-
ry responsibilities."
214
The NLRA's managerial exemption has not only precluded
unionization by private-sector managers, it has also severely restricted
unionization among professionals. In its 1980 decision NLRB v.
Yeshiva University," the Supreme Court, following its decision in Bell
Aerospace, held that professionals who exercise any measurable degree
of managerial authority lose the protection of the NLRA.2 16  In
206. See Charles P. Larrowe, A Meteor on the Industrial Relations Horizon: The Foreman's
Association of America, 2 LAB. HIST. 259, 294 (1961).
207. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
208. Seitz, supra note 114, at 240 (citing Hearings Before the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
U.S. Senate, on S.55 and S.J. Res. 22 and All Other Bills and Resolutions Referred to the Comm. Having
the Object of Reducing Industrial Stife in the United States, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 239 (1947)).
209. See Seitz, supra note 114, at 204-05.
210. See Seitz, supra note 114, at 209.
211. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
212. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974).
213. Id. at 294-95.
214. Id. at 289 n.18 (stating that if Congress had intended NLRA coverage for such
employees, it would have expressly stated it).
215. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
216. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 682-90 (1980).
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Yeshiva, the Court held that the full-time faculty of a private university
did not fall within the NLRA's coverage because the faculty per-
formed functions such as deciding what courses to offer and what
teaching methods to use.217 According to Justice Powell, the only
professionals who fall under the NLRA's protection are those "whose
decision making is limited to the routine discharge of professional
duties in projects to which they have been assigned."218
The Yeshiva decision stands as a roadblock to the organizing efforts
of large numbers of professional employees.21 9  The managerial
exemption to the NLRA has excluded from the statute's coverage not
only college faculty, but also physicians and dentists,
22° nurses,221
newspaper editors,2  and engineers, 3 and has cast doubt on the
statute's coverage of many other professional employees.
224
Even professionals not exempt from NLRA coverage due to the
managerial exemption are now more likely to be deemed exempt as
supervisors. For example, in a 1989 case, Detroit College of Business,
2
2
the NLRB abandoned its rule that a professional had to spend at least
fifty percent of his or her worktime supervising others to be deemed
a supervisor.226 Rejecting that standard, the NLRB held that "coor-
dinators" at a business college, who spent most of their time teaching
and doing other nonsupervisory work, were nonetheless supervi-
sors,227 and therefore not entitled to the protection of the NLRA,
because they spent a fraction of their time evaluating the work of
217. Id. at 674.
218. Id. at 690.
219. See Levitan & Gallo, supra note 193, at 32 (explaining that Yeshiva decision "impedes
collective action by professionals in securing workplace rights afforded to other employees"); see
also Angel, supra note 88, at 456 (explaining that antitrust and First Amendment decisions have
further restricted professionals' attempts to unionize).
220. See FHP, Inc., 274 N.L.LB. 1141, 1143 (1985) (holding that part-time physicians and
dentists are excluded from NLRA).
221. See, e.g., NLRB v. Beacon Light Christian Nursing Home, 825 F.2d 1076, 1080 (6th Cir.
1987) (finding that nursing home's practical nurse is supervisor, and thus not eligible for NLRA
protection); NLRB v. American Medical Servs., Inc., 705 F.2d 1472, 1474-75 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding nurses not protected when they enjoy discretionary powers and authority to discharge
other employees); Lincoln Lutheran of Racine, Wisconsin, Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1082 (1988)
(holding nurses to be supervisors and thus not protected by NLRA).
222. See NLRB v. Medina County Publications, Inc., 735 F.2d 199, 207 (6th Cir. 1984)
(holding that sports editor of newspaper is supervisor under NLRA).
223. See District No. 1, Pacific Coast Marine Eng'rs, 287 N.L.R.B. 628, 639-44 (1987) (denying
engineers protection under NLRA because they direct others during their shifts).
224. See Rabban, supra note 112, at 1859 (noting that Yeshiva casts doubt on unionization
eligibility of countless professionals and employees); see also Note, "ManagerialEmployee": A Label
in Search ofa Meaningful Definition, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 435, 491 (1979) (remarking that NLRA's
managerial exemption probably excludes many lawyers from coverage).
225. 296 N.LRB. 318 (1989).
226. Detroit College of Business, 296 N.L.R.B. 318, 320-21 (1989).
227. Id. at 320.
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adjunct faculty.228
Graduate students and medical interns constitute another group of
individuals who do professional work but who have been denied
protection under the NLRA.2  The NLRB has denied medical
interns and residents coverage under the NLRA in part precisely to
prevent such professional workers from bargaining collectively to limit
their work hours.238 Despite acknowledging in St. Clare's Hospital &
Health Care Centet- that "[r]esidents and interns work notoriously
long hours," the NLRB accepted the hospital's argument that it
needed such long hours for proper training and patient care.3 2
The NLRB therefore ruled against NLRA coverage on the ground that
work hours "could become bargainable should the [interns and
residents] be afforded collective bargaining rights."238
b. Professional associations
While relatively few professionals, especially in the private sector,
enjoy union representation, many belong to professional associations
that purport to represent their interests."M Professional associations,
however, generally do not help professional employees limit their
work hours. Unlike labor unions, which concern themselves primarily
with bargaining over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, professional associations tend to address issues such as
requirements for entry into the profession, standards for professional
conduct, and other issues affecting the profession as a whole.3 5
228. Id.; see also Trustees of Boston Univ., 281 N.L.R.B. 798, 860 (1986) (determining that
college faculty members are supervisors based entirely on fact that upon receiving research
grants, they hire and oversee work of research assistants).
229. See St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1004-05 (1977) (holding
paid medical interns, residents, and clinical fellows not employees for purposes of NLRA);
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621, 623 (1974) (holding paid research assistants
studying toward graduate degree not employees under NLRA). Ironically, student research
assistants are denied professional employee status under the NLRA even though they are
considered professionals under the managerial-professional exemption of the FLSA. See supra
note 80 and accompanying text (discussing Wage and Hour Division statement that student
research assistants are professionals).
230. St. Clare's Hasp., 229 N.LR.B. at 1003.
231. 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977).
232. St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 229 N.L.RtB. 1000, 1003-05 (1977).
233. Id. at 1003. Recently, members of the medical establishment have criticized the notion
that overworking interns and residents promotes quality patient care or that it is needed to
properly train aspiring physicians. See Karen Ritchie, Professionalism, Altruism, and Overwork, 13
J. MED. & PHIL. 447, 447 (1988) (arguing that overworking residents is both unethical and
detrimental to residents and patients).
234. See Levitan & Gallo, supra note 193, at 24.
235. See Levitan & Gallo, supra note 193, at 24-25; see also Bairstow & Sayes, supra note 194,
at 107. Prior to its transformation into a collective bargaining agent for teachers, the National
Education Association (NEA) acted as a professional association. See MARJORIE MURPHY,
BLACKBOARD UNIONS: THE AFT & THE NEA, 1900-1980, at 226-27 (1990). In 1938, the NEA
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Indeed, professional associations tend to be dominated by the elite of
the profession, individuals who are either high-level managers or not
employees at all, and who therefore do not share the concerns of
lower-level professionals about workplace issues.2 6  Moreover,
professional associations promote an ideology of professionalism that
is implicitly contrary to, if not explicitly hostile to, bargaining
collectively over issues such as wages and hours.27  As Sar Levitan
and Frank Gallo have observed, "Many associations have appealed-at
least publicly-to the traditional high sounding ideals of the profes-
sion. Appeals for pay increases and improved working conditions fit
uneasily into such rhetoric .... "238
Because most managerial and professional employees individually
lack sufficient bargaining power to avoid excessive hours, and because
sent a representative to testify before Congress concerning the pending Fair Labor Standards
bill. Joint Hearings, supra note 147, at 415. Tellingly, the representative addressed only child
labor issues and did not say a word about the wages, hours, and working conditions for teachers.
See id. at 415 (statement of Dr. Howard A. Dawson).
236. See Strauss, supra note 113, at 524 (stating that engineering associations "are dominated
by people already well up in the management hierarchy. They may speak up for the interests
of the profession as a whole ... but they are less likely to represent the economic interests of
individual professionals, particularly those in the lower ranks."). Similarly, prior to the mid-
1960s, school administrators, not rank-and-file teachers, dominated the NEA. See MURPHY, supra
note 235, at 228 (noting that American Federation of Teachers criticized NEA for being
dominated by administrators).
Late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century craft associations provide an historical
parallel to the modern professional association. Like today's professional associations, these
craft associations included members throughout the occupational hierarchy, including both
master craftsmen and journeymen. See SEAN WI.ENTz, CHANTS DEmOCRATIC: NEW YORK CITy
AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788-1850, at 13-60 (1984) (detailing rise of
craft associations in NewYork City). The masters who dominated the craft associations claimed
to speak on behalf of all the members of the craft. Id. at 42 (stating that master craftsmen
claimed "with all apparent sincerity to have the interests of all mechanics at heart"). Eventually,
the journeymen left the craft associations and formed labor unions, after realizing that their
status as employees gave them an interest in improving working conditions that ran counter to
the interests of the masters. Id. at 56-59. Interestingly, one of the major goals of these early
crafts unions was to limit the length of the workday. Id. at 232.
237. See generaUy MAGAu S. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1977) (discussing ideology of professionalism). Larson argues that professionalism
and concern over professional status "works as a preventive against the unity-and the
unionization-of professional workers .... " Id at 236. A former president of the National
Society of Professional Engineers expressed a view commonly held by adherents to the ideology
of professionalism when he wrote that "[o]ne cannot be a professional and belong to a union."
Levitan & Gallo, supra note 193, at 30.
For an example of medical associations opposing the organizing efforts of members of their
professions, see Mario F. Bognanno et al., Physicians' and Dentists' Bargaining Organizations: A
Preliminary Look, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1975, at 33, 34 (noting that American Medical
Association and American Dental Association strongly opposed unionization because "it would
be the very antithesis of individualism"). After years of hostility to the idea of unions
representing lawyers, the legal establishment finally acquiesced in the early 1970s, begrudgingly
stating in the Code of Professional Responsibility that union membership for lawyers was "not
necessarily improper." Levitan & Gallo, supra note 193, at 25.
238. Levitan & Gallo, supra note 193, at 32.
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most have no organization advocating on their behalf for limited
hours, one cannotjustify the failure to regulate their work hours by
arguing that such employees have the ability, without government
intervention, to avoid excessive work.
2. Do managers and professionals need limited work hours?
The proposition that managerial and professional employees do not
need limited hours because they enjoy higher salaries, better working
conditions, and more privileges than other employees is also flawed.
First, advocates of this proposition ignore the fact that many managers
and professionals enjoy little autonomy and prestige on the job 9
and receive low wages.' 4 More important, they ignore one of the
main purposes of limiting work hours: employees need limited work
hours so that they can spend more time away from work with family
or in nonvocational activities.241 High pay, good working condi-
tions, and privileges on the job may make work more tolerable, or
even enjoyable, but they have no bearing on the amount of time a
managerial or professional employee can spend away from the
workplace.
242
There is abundant evidence that many managers and professionals
seek more time away from work. A 1990 survey by the American Bar
Association, for example, found that about half of the lawyers in
private practice said that they did not have enough time for them-
selves or their families.243 A study of work conditions in the finance
industry found that professionals there too seek more time with
friends and family.' 4 Indeed, surveys of employees in all occupa-
tional groups have shown that many, if not most, would exchange
some future earnings for the chance to spend more time away from
work and with their families. 45 These surveys suggest that managers
239. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
242. To a certain extent, of course, high pay can increase the amount of time an employee
devotes to preferred activities when not at work. For example, better-paid employees can more
likely afford to pay others to perform necessary domestic chores, thus freeing up their own time
for other activities.
243. See Holt, supra note 119, at 64. Holt quotes a management consultant as stating that
"[ylou can make the firm a better place to work. But once you go beyond a certain number of
hours, over a period of years, with no time for yourself or your family, your quality of life is still
bad." Id.
244. See FISHER, supra note 124, at 148 (discussing relentlessly hectic hours of work on Wall
Street); cf. ROEDIGER & FONER, supra note 4, at 275 (noting air traffic controllers' desire to
reduce their working hours).
245. See ANN HARRIMAN, THE WORK/LEISURE TRADE OFF: REDUCED WORK TIME FOR
MANAGERS AND PROFESSIONALS 91 (1982) (citing evidence that "significant numbers of
employees, in every age and occupational category, would choose to trade some portion of
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and professionals would likely make such an exchange because,
compared to rank-and-file employees, they would be more likely able
to afford to sacrifice some earnings. 246
Female managers and professionals in particular seek more time
away from the workplace because they often must attend to family
responsibilities in addition to their jobs.247  Indeed, women seek to
avoid demands for excessive hours not only to make it easier to meet
family responsibilities, but simply to retain their jobs.248 While long
work hours combined with family demands can constrain the careers
of both partners in a two-career couple,249 it is usually the woman
who feels the social pressure to sacrifice her salaried work for the sake
of family responsibilities." ° In her study of professional women,
Alice Yohalem notes that "strong social pressures beyond the labor
market often persuade women to modify or abandon their career
goals after marriage or childbirth.""1 Thus, the excessive hours
required in managerial and professional jobs threaten to undermine
the legal, political, and social victories women have won in their
present or future income for some additional nonwork time"); SCHoR, supra note 4, at 148
(citing 1989 poll in which 80% of those surveyed responded that they would prefer career path
that allowed them more time with their families even if it slowed their career advancement).
246. One telling reflection of the desire of managers and professionals for fewer work hours
can be seen in the popularity of a recent career manual focusing entirely on advising managers
and professionals how to shift to a career path that will provide them with more free time. See
AMYSALTZMAN, DOWNSHrFrING: REINVENTING SUCCESS ONASLOWERTRACK (1991) (givingadvice
on how to select career to have more time for self); see also DIANE S. ROTHBERG & BARBARA E.
COOK, PART-TIME PROFESSIONAL (1985) (providing advice for professionals seeking part-time
positions).
247. See SCHIOR, supra note 4, at 72; supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (discussing
familial burdens on working women).
248. See generally Mortimer & Sorensen, supra note 108, at 148 (describing pressure on
women to spend more time at home).
249. See Mortimer & Sorensen, supra note 108, at 148 (explaining that where both members
of couple have managerial or professional career, couple may "feel extreme pressure of time,
trying to meet all the demands of two careers plus household and child care duties.
Consequently, both spouses may feel that their productivity and occupational achievement is
constrained by home responsibilities .... ").
250. See O'Reilly, supra note 122, at 44 (noting that women are much more likely than men
to let family demands affect their careers); see also Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-3, § 2(a) (5), 107 Stat. 6, 7 (1993) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2601) (reporting
congressional finding that responsibility for family caretaking "affects the working lives of women
more than it affects the working lives of men"); ROEDIGER & FONER, supra note 4, at 276
(arguing that many women feel pressured to work part time in order to devote more time to
family); Mortimer & Sorensen, supra note 108, at 148 (stating that "[c]areer demands... may
pose particular problems for mothers, who feel the opposing demands of their children's
needs"). Moreover, women who express the need for more time away from the job "may be
particularly vulnerable to charges of lack of professionalism." HARRIMAN, supra note 245, at 88.
251. AUCE M. YOHALEM, THE CAREERS OF PROFESSIONAL WOMEN: COMMrTMENT AND
CONFLICT 28 (1979).
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efforts to enter such occupations. 2  Moreover, as long as female
managers and professionals drop out of the workforce, the
underrepresentation of women in the higher ranks of management
will continue."
Clearly, the decent salaries and working conditions enjoyed by many
managerial and professional employees, both male and female, cannot
substitute for time away from the workplace. Good working condi-
tions therefore cannot justify the failure to regulate the work hours
of managerial and professional employees. 4
D. The Cost to Employers Versus the Social Benefits of Hours Regulation
Congress may have exempted managerial and professional
employees from the FLSA simply because it did not want to impose
upon employers the cost of compensating such employees for
overtime hours worked. Employers opposed the enactment of the
FLSA in large part because of the costs the Act would impose on their
operations.- Given employers' resistance to increased costs, their
resistance to paying overtime compensation to managerial and
professional employees, had it been proposed, would likely have been
intense. Indeed, shortly after the Act's passage, the Wage and Hour
252. See KANTER, supra note 4, at 293 (explaining that excessive hours present "the danger
of excluding half the workforce-women-from the better jobs. While equal employment
opportunity policies open up hopes of high positions for women, new work systems ... may
increase barriers to getting them.").
253. See ROEDIGER & FONER, supra note 4, at 276 (warning that unless men take more
responsibility for childcare, women will be unable to compete equally for promotions).
Marshall Breger suggests that one reason for the underrepresentation of women in top
management is that women exercise their "personal choice" to pursue the "Mommy Track,"
rather than climb the corporate ladder. Breger, supra note 106, at 422. Excessive employer
demands on female managers, however, when coupled with the burden of family responsibilities,
tend to make such a "personal choice" less than voluntary. Id.
254. The recent passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107
Stat. 6 (1993) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2601), demonstrates the obsolescence of the notion
that managers and professionals have no need for government regulation of their work time.
That statute, which gives employees the right to 12 weeks of unpaid leave from work to care for
a newborn child or sick family member, § 102(a) (1), 107 Stat. at 9, contains no exemption for
managers or professionals. § 101(2), 107 Stat. at 7-8. It seems clear that in framing the
legislation, Congress did not subscribe to the view that managers and professionals have
sufficient bargaining power to negotiate such a leave for themselves, nor that the benefits and
privileges such employees receive on the job would make such a leave unnecessary.
255. See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 147, at 537-38, 652, 765 (reporting statements by
garment industry employers' organization, by National Association of Manufacturers, and by
President of Southern States Industrial Council that FLSA would substantially increase labor
costs); id. at 936 (statement of George H. Davis, President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce)
(suggesting that FLSA could impose uncertainty on commercial venturers and increase labor
costs); see a/soJAMES A. HODGES, NEW DEAL LABOR POUCY AND THE SOUTHERN COTtON TEXTILE
INDuSnRY 1933-1941, at 180 (1986) (reporting that congressional representatives from Southern
states who opposed Fair Labor Standards bill "feared that higher labor standards would handicap
the development of southern industry by removing the South's great advantage, cheap labor").
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Administrator reported that most of the employer comments he had
received concerned how broadly the Wage and Hour Division would
interpret the managerial and professional exemption.2
6
No doubt today employers would continue to oppose application
of the FLSA to managerial and professional employees, complaining
that the overtime compensation would be too costly. The proposal
presented in this Article would require employers to provide their
managerial and professional employees with comp time, rather than
overtime pay, and thus would not increase the incomes earned by
managers and professionals. Nonetheless, mandated comp time
would increase employers' costs by forcing them to hire more
employees. 7 This increased cost to employers, however, does not
justify the failure to regulate the work hours of managers and
professionals.
In enacting the FLSA, Congress implicitly decided that the social
costs of failing to regulate the hours of employees outweighed the
cost to employers that such regulation would produce. In part,
enactment of the FLSA represented a determination that the high
social cost of unemployment justified imposing extra costs on those
employers who aggravated unemployment by requiring their
employees to work excessive hours."8 It also represented a determi-
nation that the heavy burden borne by those employees required to
work excessive hours justified imposing the extra costs of overtime
compensation on their employers. 9 This same calculus, which
produced FLSA regulation for employees now covered by the Act,
applies equally to managers and professionals.
First, as noted above, managerial and professional employees, like
other employees, suffer from unemployment.2" Unemployment in
the managerial-professional workforce places a strain on the public
treasury by reducing tax revenues while increasing the amount of
unemployment compensation benefits the government pays.
261
256. See May Bar Overtime for High Pay Group, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1938, at 4. A 1940 lobbying
effort by representatives of wholesale distributors provides one example of employer concern
over the costs of pay for managers and professionals. According to a Business Week report, the
representatives complained that the Wage and Hour Division's narrow interpretations of the
managerial-professional exemption "only serve to burden the wholesale trades by increasing high
wages paid department heads," and that the wholesale industry employers could not 'stand
increased costs in the face of growing competition." Who's an Executive?, supra note 54, at 37.
257. See infra text accompanying note 263.
258. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 128-38 and accompanying text.
261. See David R. Francis, Are Those Working Overtime Whistling?, CHRISTiN Sa. MONrrOR, Apr.
2, 1993, at 8.
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Moreover, it puts significant financial and psychological strains on the
unemployed individuals and their families. 62 Were employers
required, as this Article proposes, to provide time off for overtime
hours worked, many employers would need to increase their hiring.
Indeed, economists Ronald Ehrenberg and Paul Schumann have
estimated that tens of thousands of new jobs would be created by a
reduction in the overtime hours worked by managerial and profes-
sional employees.2 6  The benefit to society and to unemployed
workers from this increase in jobs would largely justify the cost to
employers created by eliminating the Act's managerial-professional
exemption.
Second, restricting work hours for managers and professionals
would produce substantial benefits for those already employed.
Managers and professionals would have more time to spend with their
families and in nonwork pursuits, time that many such employees now
lack.2' The reduction of work hours would benefit female manag-
ers and professionals in particular by permitting them to juggle
workplace and family responsibilities more easily, thus helping them
to keep their jobs and even gain promotions.2' The benefit to
society alone of creating a more even gender balance in the manage-
rial-professional workforce would justify the increased costs to
employers.
Moreover, restricting the work hours of managers and professionals
would provide benefits beyond those traditionally used tojustify FLSA
coverage. Restricting work hours would increase productivity.
26
Excessive hours tend to decrease morale, increase errors, and lower
262. See generally CARRIE R. LEANA & DANIEL C. FELDMAN, COPING WITH JOB LOSS: How
INDIVIDUALS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND COMMUNITIES RESPOND TO LAYOFFS 45-75 (1992) (discussing
employee reactions to unemployment); PAULA G. LEVENTMAN, PROFESSIONALS OUT OFWORK 133-
66 (1981) (discussing plight of unemployed professionals); Labich, supra note 132, at 42 (noting
that depression, alcoholism, and marital stress often accompany unemployment).
263. See EHRENBERG & SCHUMANN, supra note 47, at 46. According to their study, if the more
than 500,000 professional and technical employees who worked overtime in May 1978 had
worked 20% fewer hours, more than 25,000 new jobs might have been created. Id. Similarly,
if the more than 300,000 managers and administrators who worked overtime during that month
had worked 20% fewer hours, approximately 17,000 newjobs might have been created. Id.; see
also Zalusky, supra note 4, at 1 (estimating that limiting all employees to forty hours per week
would create seven million newjobs).
264. See supra notes 125-27, 243-46 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 247-53 and accompanying text.
266. See Marshall, supra note 35, at 50-51 (arguing that limiting work hours will reduce
fatigue and lead to increased productivity). Prior to the FLSA, the desire to increase workers'
productivity and decrease accidents helped fuel the century-long drive to limit the length of the
workday. Id.; see also CAHILL, supra note 31, at 31-58 (discussing goal of labor unions, after Civil
War, to shorten workday); ROEDIGER & FONER, supra note 4, at 244-45 (noting that demand for
shorter work hours was great during 1930s).
[Vol. 43:139
1993] FLSA's MANAGERIAL-PROFESSIONAL EXEMPTION 179
work efficiency.267 In fact, a recent study by the Japanese Govern-
ment found thatJapanese managerial employees work less productive-
ly than their counterparts in other advanced economies in part
because they work excessive hours.268 Because excessive hours tend
to lower productivity, the U.S. economy would benefit if managers
and professionals had more time off, during which time other, rested
employees performed the work. 9  Upon returning to their jobs
after comp time, managers and professionals would approach work
fresh, with both more vitality and a greater ability to produce for the
employer.270
Regulating the hours of managerial and professional employees
would also benefit less privileged workers by reducing pressure on the
rank and file to work excessive hours. To a certain extent, the long
hours managers and professionals work create pressure on employees
lower in the hierarchy to increase their hours. 7' This downward
pressure most directly affects those who work closely with managers
and professionals, such as secretaries, clerical workers, and paraprofes-
sionals.272 Eventually, the pressure spreads throughout an organiza-
267. See Ritchie, supra note 233, at 449 (noting that patient care suffers when medical
residents work long hours because "fatigued residents make more errors than those who are
well-rested"); Kilborn, supra note 121, at E3 (remarking that excessive hours of work do not
benefit economy because after certain number of hours on job, "many people are just spinning
their wheels," and suggesting that long work hours are leading to low morale because "the
quickening pace ... is burning them out"); Ford S. Worthy, Executive Life: You're Probably
Working Too Hard, FORTUNE, Apr. 27, 1987, at 133, 140 (commenting that "[o]verdoing it is not
only harmful to your health but often hazardous to the quality of your work. There's a point
at which anyone's performance starts to fade.").
268. SeeSCHOR, supra note 4, at 154. The study revealed thatJapanese office employees work
almost six weeks more per year than those in the United States. Id. A bill to reduce the
workweek is currently pending before the Japanese parliament. Bill Would EncourageJapanese to
Work Less, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at A17-A18 (Mar. 5, 1993).
269. See Diane S. Rothberg, Part-Time Professionals: The Flexible Work Force, PFRsom ADMiN.,
Aug. 1986, at 29, 31-32 (suggesting use of part-time professionals to relieve those full-time
professionals, especially women with children, who need reduced hours "to recharge their
energies and motivation"). Of course, regulating the work hours of managers and professionals
might harm the short-term profitability of individual firms, due to the increased costs associated
with increased hiring. But as Robert Reich amply demonstrates, it is workers' productivity, not
the profitability of firms, that ultimately determines a nation's standard of living. See REICH,
supra note 136, at 244.
270. See Rothberg, supra note 269, at 32 (explaining that reduced work hours will enable
many professionals to bring renewed energy and enthusiasm to jobs).
271. See KANR, supra note 4, at 269.
272. See Kilbom, supra note 121, at E3 (noting that because executives and professionals are
working longer hours, "the secretaries and clerks who tail alongside them" are increasingly
working longer than 40-hour weeks); see alsoJennings, supra note 79, at 327 (remarking that
"[t]o be able to share in the tasks and experiences of the professional, the paraprofessional must
be permitted to work with the professional, not only during work hours, but also during those
times when the professional is required to work overtime").
THE AMERICAN UN1VERSnIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:139
don, even to blue-collar workers.'" As Juliet Schor notes, in recent
years "the longer schedules penetrated far down the corporate ladder,
through middle management, into the secretarial pool, and even onto
the factory floor itself."274 Limiting the hours of managers and
professionals would reduce the pressure on lower-level employees to
work longer hours and would thereby help alleviate the stress
excessive work places on these workers.
75
Amending the FLSA as this Article proposes might also spur those
remaining professionals still protected by the NLRA to engage in
collective bargaining, the encouragement of which constitutes one of
the central tenets of this country's labor policy. 6  Regulating the
work hours of professional employees might promote their unioniza-
tion by countering the ideology of professionalism, which stands as a
principal obstacle to the unionization of professionals. 7 7 The
ideology of professionalism teaches professionals to cherish their
privileged status 78 and to give unstintingly of their time to their
employer.2 79  ELSA regulation would undermine that aspect of the
professional ideology that demands unlimited work hours. Once
273. See KANTER, supra note 4, at 273 (discussing increased pressures on blue-collar workers
resulting from business reform strategies undertaken in 1970s and 1980s).
274. SCHOR, supra note 4, at 20.
275. See SCHOR, supra note 4, at 10-13 (discussing impact of excessive hours on rank-and-file
employees, and, in particular, citing debilitating levels of stress, sleep deficits, and neglect of
family as among health and social problems generated by overwork). The long history of efforts
by the labor movement to shorten the workday, see supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text,
shows the widespread desire among the rank and file to avoid excessive hours.
276. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) ("It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United
States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce
... by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.. . ."). For a discussion
of the benefits of collective bargaining, including more equitable distribution of income and
increased efficiency, see RICHARD B. FRExMAN &JAMEs L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 14-17
(1984). See also Note, One Strike and You're Out? Creating an Effitient Permanent Replacement
Doctrine, 106 HARV. L. REV. 669, 676-78 (1993) (discussing how unions benefit economy).
277. See Levitan & Gallo, supra note 193, at 35-36. According to Levitan and Gallo:
The American labor movement has had limited success in enticing professional
organizations to join the house of labor and individual private sector association
members have, with few exceptions, shunned collective bargaining.... The issue of
"professionalism" remains a stubborn impediment to bargaining by associations whose
memberships are concentrated in the private sector. The stumbling block is that many
professionals believe that bargaining would cause conflict between managers and
professionals. Proponents of bargaining counter that some conflict of interest is
inherent in an employment relationship, and that professionals are hurting themselves
in believing otherwise. But beyond a declaration in favor of collective action, the AFL-
CIO has not undertaken a serious drive to organize professionals, possibly reflecting
a belief that such an attempt would be futile.
Id.; see also Strauss, supra note 113, at 522-24 (discussing problems of engineering union's effort
to organize).
278. See LARSON, supra note 237, at 236 (describing ideology of professionalism).
279. See HARRB4AN, supra note 245, at 86 (noting that despite professionals' desire to spend
more time away from work, professionalism dictates that their time belongs to employer).
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professionals learn that, despite the ideology of professionalism, they
have a right not to work excessive hours, they might seek further rules
regulating the workplace and might even decide to seek a collective
bargaining agent.2"
Moreover, simply having managerial and professional employees
spend more time away from the workplace might promote their
unionization. Commentators have suggested that one of the effects,
if not the purposes, of requiring long hours of managerial and
professionals is to create an attachment to the job which trumps other
aspects of the employees' lives. Diane Margolis, in her study of
managerial employees, writes that corporate employers create "work
situations that put the corporation into competition with other
institutions or persons who might lay claim on the man. These
competitons ... are in fact intentional enforcers or tests of the man's
loyalty to the corporation."" In a similar view, Karen Ritchie
writes, concerning the medical profession, that "one [possible]
purpose of residency is to limit [the resident's] interaction with others
enough so that the resident is forced to identify primarily with the
profession and to absorb its values.""' Government-mandated time
off would give the overworked manager or professional some
psychological distance from the job and from the employer, a
psychological distance that is often necessary before an employee can
become receptive to the idea of unionization.
The unionization of professionals, and of public-sector managerial
employees in jurisdictions where allowed, would provide a boost to
the ailing labor movement.28 3 The presence of professionals and
managers not only would augment the ranks of the labor movement,
it would infuse the movement with highly skilled and educated
individuals who would be valuable allies to their trade-union col-
leagues.284
280. Cf. ARONOWrrz, supra note 110, at 506 (noting "mild tendency" among professionals to
unionize in industries where manual workers have organized).
281. MARGOLIS, supra note 120, at 63; see also LARSON, supra note 237, at 236 (noting that
universal norm for professionals and managers is to be committed and loyal to organization).
282. Ritchie, supra note 233, at 451.
283. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FuTuRE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 9-10 (1990) (noting that by 1990, union membership had declined to such
extent that unions represented approximately same proportion (15%) of private-sector
workforce as when Congress enacted NLRA in 1935). See generally MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE
DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 115-52 (1987) (discussing decline in
unionization due to changes in economy and in social composition of labor force).
284. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 276, at 244-45 (suggesting that white-collar workers
could begin revival of labor movement).
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E. The Feasibility of Regulating the Work Hours of Managerial and
Professional Employees
One could attempt to justify the FLSA's managerial-professional
exemption by arguing that regulating the work hours of such
employees would simply not be feasible. Concededly, an absolute ban
on overtime work by managerial and professional employees would
not work. Many tasks performed by managers and professionals
cannot be confined to certain fixed hours, but frequently spill over
into evenings and weekends.2" For example, in a case concerning
medical interns and residents, the NLRB wrote that "[u] nfortunately,
medical emergencies do not always conveniently occur between the
hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday." 8 Moreover,
these tasks usually do not permit an easy substitution of personnel;
efficiency usually demands that the same individual who begins the
task sees it through to completion. Again, medical interns and
residents serve as an example: "continuity of care is important-the
best person to care for [patients] at night is the one who has been
providing that care during the day."
287
While an absolute ban on overtime would be unworkable, the FLSA,
as it now stands, does not impose such a ban; it simply creates a
financial disincentive to working covered employees beyond forty
hours per week. Nor would the comp time amendment proposed
here ban overtime work by managerial and professional employees.
The amendment would allow an employer to demand overtime, but
it would also require the employer to provide the employee with an
equivalent amount of time off at some later date.
If the FLSA regulated the hours of managerial and professional
employees, the employer would need to record the hours that such
employees work to determine the amount of overtime they perform.
This recordkeeping obligation, while an additional burden on
employers, would not constitute an obstacle to the amendment
proposed in this Article. The FLSA now requires employers to record
the hours worked by covered employees.288 For those managers and
professionals who work standard shifts, the recordkeeping burden
would be slight; the employer would only need to note any additional
285. See Kilborn, supra note 121, at E3 (reporting that approximately 57% of surveyed
executives average 6-20 hours in excess of 40-hour workweek).
286. St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1003 (1977).
287. Ritchie, supra note 233, at 448.
288. See 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (1988) (mandating that "[e]very employer subject to any
provision of this chapter ... shall make, keep, and preserve such records of the persons
employed by him and of the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment").
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hours worked beyond the employee's shift. Recordkeeping would be
more difficult for those, such as college professors, who do not work
any set hours in any set place. Nonetheless, such employees could
simply track their own hours-spent researching, writing, and meeting
with others, for example-just as private-sector lawyers do now, and
inform the employer of the hours they have worked. 89
Unscrupulous managerial and professional employees might lie to
their employers about the hours that they have worked and claim
overtime compensation to which they are not entitled.' Monitor-
ing the hours worked by managers and professionals to prevent the
"theft" of overtime compensation could pose a problem for employers
because such employees often work beyond the range of supervi-
sion-while on business trips, for example. Moreover, much of what
managers and professionals do constitutes mental labor, so even when
they work within the employer's purview, their work, unlike that of
machine operators, for instance, takes place invisibly.' Arguably,
if managers and professionals inflated their work hours, they could
cheat their employers.
This possibility fails, however, to justify maintaining the Act's
managerial-professional exemption. Many employees now covered by
the Act conceivably can cheat when reporting their hours. Seam-
stresses 2 or telemarketing employees," who work at home, or
drivers on the road, 4 for example, work beyond the scope of their
employers' immediate supervision. Congress regulated the hours of
such employees despite the prospect of cheating. Furthermore,
289. For examples of how lawyers keep records of hours worked, see Palila v. Hawaii Dep't
of Land & Natural Resources, 118 F.R.D. 125, 127 (D. Haw. 1987); In re Photon, Inc., 26 B.R
693, 698 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982). For a judicial finding regarding the hours worked by a
professor, see Savering v. United States, 18 CI. Ct. 704, 707 (1989) ("[W]hether Professor
Savering was engaged in coaching, recruiting, teaching, coordinating the efforts of his
colleagues, or supervising the intramural activities, his time spent... was in excess of 40
hours/week.") (footnote omitted).
290. But cf. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686-87 (1946) (noting that
employee seeking to obtain overtime compensation under FISA "has the burden of proving that
he performed work for which he was not properly compensated").
291. See Savering, 18 Cl. Ct. at 707 n.3 (noting that "[t]he professional nature of Professor
Savering's positions understandably makes some of hisjob aspects... not as readily identifiable
as if he were working on an assembly line").
292. See, e.g., Silent Woman, Ltd. v. Donovan, 585 F. Supp. 447, 452 (E.D. Wis. 1984)
(holding that seamstresses working at home were employees under FLSA and were responsible
for setting and recording weekly hours).
293. See, e.g., Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1389 (3d Cir. 1985)
(holding that telemarketing researchers, conducting telephone solicitations at home, were
nonexempt employees under FLSA).
294. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Osceola Farms Co., 372 F.2d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that
tractor or semitrailer tractor drivers transporting natural sugarcane from independent growers
are covered by FLSA).
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managers and professionals would have a strong incentive not to
inflate their reported work hours because inflating their hours would
create the impression that it took them a long time to perform their
assigned work. Such apparently low productivity would displease the
employer, and displeasing the employer is something that managers
and professionals, most of whom are eager for career advancement,
try to avoid.
Even if managers and professionals did occasionally cheat, such
cheating probably would not outweigh the cheating committed by
employers. In nonunion workplaces where employees do not feel
secure enough to demand their due, employers often deny employees
benefits to which they are legally entitled. 95 In particular, many
employers deny their employees overtime pay required by the
FLSA.296  Such cheating by employers would likely occur even
regarding the FLSA overtime rights of managerial and professional
employees.
In addition to simply lying about their work hours in order to
obtain comp time, managers and professionals might manipulate the
pace of their work. By definition,297 managers and professionals
enjoy at least some discretion in determining how to perform their
work, including when and how long to work on a particular pro-
ject.29s  By working more slowly, a manager or professional could
conceivably generate comp time because at the slower pace, comple-
tion of a given task might require work beyond the standard
workweek. Clearly, such a deliberate manipulation of the pace of
work, in order to generate comp time, would be unfair to employers.
This potential problem, however, also fails tojustify the managerial-
professional exemption. First, many employees now covered by the
Act have some control over the pace of their work,2 9 yet the
possibility of such employees manipulating their workspeed did not
295. See SCHOR, supra note 4, at 143; WEILER, supra note 283, at 157-59.
296. See EHRENBERG & SCHUMANN, supra note 47, at 82-83 (asserting "highly conservative
estimate" that 10% of employers fail to complywith Act's overtime provision); Overtime Vtolaters?,
WAUL ST.J., Mar. 9, 1993, at Al (reporting that approximately 46% of 600 companies surveyed
denied secretaries overtime pay, even though 27% of companies believed that at least some of
these secretaries were not exempt from FISA).
297. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.107(a) (1992) (listing "customary exercise of discretion" as
requirement of FLSA's professional employee exemption); id. § 541.305(a), (b) (noting that
professional employee status requires "consistent exercise of discretion andjudgment").
298. According to the U.S. Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division, discretion
"implies that the person has the authority or power to make an independent choice, free from
immediate direction or supervision." 29 C.F.R. § 541.207(a) (1992).
299. See, e.g., Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 706 F. Supp. 493,496-98 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (holding that
FLSA covers television reporters despite their control and influence over news story), affld; 918
F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1990).
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stop Congress from providing them with coverage under the FLSA.
Second, given that most managerial and professional employees now
work excessive hours,' attempts by such employees to stretch their
work over a longer period seems unlikely. Indeed, it would seem
particularly pointless for employees to work extra hours deliberately
if the FLSA simply mandated that their employers compensate them
for those extra hours with an equivalent amount of time off, as this
Article advocates. Finally, as mentioned previously with respect to
cheating on hours, most managers and professionals probably would
not deliberately slow the pace of their work because low productivity
would displease their employers and thus hurt their career opportuni-
ties.
Another possible objection to providing FLSA coverage to managers
and professionals would be that employers might lack control over the
amount of comp time such employees earn. For example, if a
particular project unexpectedly became more time-consuming and
required an employee to work overtime, the employer, under this
proposal, would have to provide that employee with comp time at
some later date, even if the employer had not planned to provide the
employee with time off. The possibility of such occurrences, however,
does not justify failing to amend the FLSA.'3 Any extra work
performed by an employee on a given project presumably benefits the
employer, particularly if the employer bills the customer or client
based on the number of hours the employee worked on the project.
Under current law, it is the managerial or professional employee who
bears the risk that a given task will take extra hours to complete
because the employee receives no additional compensation for the
extra hours. The amendment proposed in this Article would properly
shift that risk to the employer, the party that stands to gain from the
extra work.
Furthermore, the employer would not completely lack control over
the amount of comp time earned. If the employer were truly
determined to deny a particular employee comp time, the employer
could order the employee to cease working on the task and assign the
task to another employee, or contract with another firm to complete
the work. In short, no overtime work would be compensable unless
300. See supra text accompanying notes 117-24.
301. It is relevant to note that federal employees may receive premium pay even for those
overtime hours which "cannot be controlled administratively." 5 U.S.C. § 5545(c) (2) (1988);
see, e.g., Battenfield v. United States, 648 F.2d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that INS
border patrol agents are entitled to "administratively uncontrollable" overtime compensation for
overtime hours spent monitoring and responding to criminal behavior, even though hours
required for such work could not "be reasonably predicted").
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approved by the employer."0 2
In evaluating the feasibility of regulating the work hours of
managers and professionals, it is helpful to note that such regulation
already exists. In Germany, Sweden, and certain Canadian provinces,
for example, the statute governing work hours applies to professionals
as well as nonprofessionals."' Moreover, in the United States,
certain employers, by agreement with their employees, provide comp
time to their professional workers. Both the Legal Aid Society of New
York and the National Labor Relations Board, for example, provide
comp time to their staff attorneys who perform certain assignments
outside of regular working hours."'w Finally, one should note that
federal legislation requiring employers to grant managerial and
professional employees time off already exists, albeit in limited
circumstances: the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, which
provides employees the right to twelve weeks leave from work to care
for a newborn child or sick family member,"° contains no exemp-
tion for managerial and professional employees.0 6
IV. PROPOSAL
The regulation of managers' and professionals' work hours would
be feasible and would produce tangible benefits.0 7 In the absence
of a legitimate reason for failing to do so, Congress should enact such
regulation. This Article does not propose, however, that the FLSA
require employers to pay managerial and professional employees extra
wages for overtime hours worked, as the Act now requires for covered
employees. Rather, the FLSA should require employers to compen-
sate managers and professionals for hours worked beyond a statutorily
302. See Gaines v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 497,498 (1962) (noting that, for overtime work
to be compensable, employer must authorize it).
303. See 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 66,
83 (1987) (discussing work hours limitations in West Germany and Sweden); GARY E. MURG &
JOHN C. Fox, LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CANADA, MEXICO AND WESTERN EUROPE 175, 180 (1978)
(observing that limitations on work hours apply to all employees in Canadian provinces of New
Brunswick, Ontario, and Quebec and in Canada's Northwest Territories and Yukon Territory).
304. See 1988-1990 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the Legal Aid Society and the
Association of Legal Aid Attorneys, District 65, U.AW., at 37-38 (on file with The American
University Law Review); 1989-1992 Agreement Between the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board and the NLRB Union, Covering Field Office Professional Employees, at
151 (on file with The American University Law Review) (providing "compensatory leave" for
overtime hours worked).
305. SeeFamily and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 102(a) (1), 107 Star. 6,
9 (1993).
306. See § 101 (2), 107 Stat. at 7-8 (defining eligible employees for medical and family leave).
307. See supra text accompanying notes 263-70 (discussing benefits associated with regulation
of managerial-professional work hours, such as reduced unemployment, increased productivity,
and improved quality of life).
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defined standard workweek by providing them with comp time.
Compensating overworked managers and professionals with comp
time instead of overtime pay has advantages in addition to those
already discussed.' First, it would probably save employers money
because the high wages earned by most managers and profession-
als' would make overtime rates prohibitive. Indeed, it was precise-
ly in order to save public employers money that Congress allowed
state and local governments to meet their FLSA obligations by
providing their employees with comp time rather than with overtime
pay.3"' While reducing the financial burden on employers, the
provision mandating comp time would not create a hardship for most
managerial and professional employees, because, as noted, such
employees are generally well-paid."
Mandating comp time rather than overtime pay would also help
ensure the success of the desired goal: reducing the work hours of
managerial and professional employees. If the FLSA required
overtime pay, employers might still choose to continue to work their
managers and professionals excessive hours and simply incur the cost
of the overtime pay. The promise of overtime pay at premium rates
might even entice many managers and professionals, interested in
padding their paychecks, to increase their hours of work." 2 Such an
increase would only aggravate problems such as unemployment for
other managers and professionals. Mandating comp time for
managerial and professional employees would help ensure that their
308. See supra notes 271-84 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (indicating that managers and
professionals typically receive higher salaries than other types of employees).
310. SeeTodd D. Steenson, Note, The Public Sector Compensatory Time Exception to the Fair Labor
Standards Act: Trying to Compensate for Congress's Lack of Clarity, 75 MiNN. L. REV. 1807, 1844
(1991) (explaining that congressional enactment of comp time was designed to reduce state's
burden of complying with overtime requirements of FLSA); see also S. REP. No. 159, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1985), rprinted in 1985 U.S.C.CA.N. 651, 655-56 ("The Committee recognizes that
the financial costs of coming into compliance with the FLSA-particuarly the overtime
provisions of section 7-are a matter of grave concern to many states and localities."). The
provision allowing such payment of comp time can be found at 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (1) (1988).
311. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (noting that managerial and professional
employees generally earn higher pay than other employees). As noted above, not all
managerial-professional employees enjoy high wages. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying
text. Those that receive low wages should receive extra pay, rather than time off, for overtime
hours worked. To ensure that these employees are entitled to overtime pay, the minimum salary
levels in the Wage and Hours regulations, which are now scandalously low, should be raised to
such levels that no employee earning significantly less than the average managerial-professional
wage could be deemed an executive, administrative, or professional employee under the Act.
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing minimum salaries for executive,
administrative, and professional employees).
312. See, e.g., SCHOR, supra note 4, at 141 (noting that overtime provision of FLSA--originally
designed to reduce excessive hours-now frequently encourages covered employees to work long
hours in order to maximize their pay).
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total work hours decrease.13
At least two other commentators have recently called for comp time
for managerial and professional employees. Rosabeth Kanter, in her
study of modem American business, urges companies voluntarily to
give their managers and professionals time off in order to "make
space for" their personal lives.314 Juliet Schor goes beyond suggest-
ing that employers voluntarily provide such periods of "relaxation and
renewal," and calls for a legal mandate requiring employers to provide
their salaried employees with comp time. i5
The proposal in this Article differs from Schor's recommendation,
however, in that Schor would allow the employer to determine the
length of the standard workweek for managerial and professional
employees.31' This Article proposes that Congress, not employers,
establish a standard workweek, hours beyond which would be
deemed overtime. If employers could determine the length of the
standard workweek, they could use their superior bargaining
power37 to set excessively long standard workweeks. Such overly
long standard workweeks would effectively deny employees comp time
because all the employees' work hours would fall within the employer-
determined standard week. The length of the standard workweek,
therefore, should be set by legislation. Congress, however, need not
be insensitive to the needs of employers. Congress could, and
probably should, set the standard workweek at greater than the forty
hours now set for covered employees. Moreover, different standard
workweeks could be created for different types of managers and
professionals.
CONCLUSION
In response to increased competition in the American economy,
employers in recent years have reduced their managerial and
313. SeeSCHOR, supranote 4, at 143 (noting that one byproduct of shifting toward comp time
would be reduction in number of hours worked by employees).
314. KANTER, supra note 4, at 359. Kanter suggests that one cannot
expect many people or companies to tolerate reduced hours every day or every week.
Instead, time-out should be organized around... the rhythms of projects. Periods of
intense work should be matched by periods of relaxation and renewal.... [T]hese
moments should mark a clear ending of one intense effort and a pause for personal
life before beginning the next.
Id.
315. See SCHOR, supra note 4, at 142-43 (arguing for comp time instead of overtime pay for
hours worked in excess of company-determined and government-enforced standard).
316. See SCHOR, supra note 4, at 142.
317. See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text (explaining that managers and
professionals lack bargaining power relative to their employers).
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professional staffs while demanding excessive hours of the managers
and professionals that they continue to employ. These measures have
not only aggravated white-collar unemployment, but have sharply
reduced the amount of time that employed managers and profession-
als can devote to their families and other nonwork pursuits. In
particular, employers' demands for excessive hours have made it
exceedingly difficult for women with family responsibilities to
maintain managerial or professional jobs, let alone to advance in the
management hierarchy.
No good reason exists to maintain the FLSA's managerial-profes-
sional exemption. Clearly, no constitutional restraint would prevent
regulating the work hours of managers and professionals. Moreover,
the notion that managerial and professional employees have no need
for such regulation rests on a pair of misconceptions: first, that
managers and professionals have sufficient bargaining power to limit
their hours; and second, that their relatively high pay and superior
benefits make more time away from the job unnecessary. Regulating
the work hours of managers and professionals would impose a cost on
employers, but the overall benefits to be gained, such as reducing
unemployment, increasing productivity, and enriching the lives of
affected employees, would more than justify the increased costs.
Requiring comp time for managers and professionals, instead of
overtime pay, would be the better legislative solution. Comp time
would probably impose fewer costs on employers than would overtime
pay, and it would ensure that the excessive hours worked by manageri-
al and professional employees are in fact reduced. Accordingly,
Congress should amend the FLSA to require employers to provide
time off to their managerial and professional employees for hours
worked beyond a statutorily defined standard workweek.

